



# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

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**JIEFANGJUN BAO on U.S. Nuclear Operations**  
*HK1402141190 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO*  
*in Chinese 5 Feb 90 p 3*

[Article by Li Chuanzi (2621 0278 3320): "The United States Is Making a New Plan for Nuclear Operations"]

[Text] The Strategic Goal Joint Planning Chief of Staff Headquarters under the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) is making a new plan for nuclear operations in the new period, to provide the U.S. President with multiple choices in the use of strategic nuclear forces.

The U.S. plan for nuclear operations is also called "Plan for (United) [tong yi 4827 0001] Nuclear Operations"—which came into being in 1960—and had been revised six times by 1 October 1983. The present one is the seventh of its kind, and the contents are: to select the strategic offensive targets; to arrange serial nuclear offensives in order of targets' importance; to determine the weapon systems for various categories of targets in offensive operations; and to formulate plans for implementing strategic nuclear operations.

Why should the United States create a new plan for nuclear operations when the international situation is tending toward relaxation? Observers believe that despite the fact that the U.S.-USSR treaty on intermediate guided missiles was signed in December 1987, that their talks on cutting back 50 percent of offensive strategic weapons are under way, and that the Soviet strategic thinking on nuclear war has also undergone some changes, the U.S.-USSR nuclear arms race has not stopped. They pointed out that the United States has already fulfilled the first-phase tasks of the plan for updating strategic nuclear forces—since its implementation in October 1981—and in 1986, it deployed MX intercontinental guided missiles and B-1B strategic bombers. The USSR deployed SS-25 and SS-24 mobile intercontinental guided missiles in 1985 and 1987, respectively. In the sphere of strategic defensive technology, both the United States and the USSR have made rather fast progress in recent years. The new U.S. plan for nuclear operations has been set forth precisely under such circumstances.

The United States has, in recent years, discovered that the USSR possesses approximately 1,500 reinforced bunkers for the employment of some 175,000 leading members of the upper strata, with a secret underground railway running 27.3 km from the Kremlin to Vnukovo Airport. The United States is worried that the huge defensive network which has taken shape with the surfacing of these projects will greatly reduce the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Therefore, the primary target in the new plan for nuclear operations will be "destroying the Soviet underground defensive project, and causing casualties among the leading Soviet group." In addition, they have determined to develop some new weapon which is capable of penetrating the underground project, with the requirement that "in the first few hours of the initial phase of a nuclear war, the new weapon launches an offensive on the very spot where the Soviet leading group is located," so that it becomes powerless in organization and command. Observers have

noticed that the United States has made voluminous preparations for realizing this goal. Back in September 1988, the U.S. Department of Defense issued an order to develop an earth-drilling nuclear weapon. At present, the United States is researching and producing a kind of metal warhead with a strength capable of boring 183 m into the earth (its underground explosive force was some 40-fold that on earth surface), as well as another type of mechanical warhead capable of drilling into the ground. The U.S. SAC Headquarters recently proposed the conception of conveying ground-boring bombs by cruising missiles of slower flying speed.

Another key to the new plan for nuclear operations is mobile strategic targets in the USSR. It was learned that the USSR has already deployed 30 SS-24 mobile intercontinental guided missiles on railways, and 166 SS-25 mobile intercontinental guided missiles on highways. The train conveying SS-24 guided missiles is capable of running on most of the branches of its 125,000 km of railway network, while the cars carrying SS-25 guided missiles are capable of running on vast fields and highways in remote areas of the USSR. By the mid-1990s, approximately half of the strategic targets in the USSR will have become mobile. For dealing with such a situation, the new plan for nuclear operations has laid special stress on data-collection of movable targets of mobile guided missiles. Furthermore, the plan has proposed the need to develop the invisible "Aurora" [ao luo la 1159 5012 2139] reconnaissance plane—which is capable of flying with 5MH at top speed—to research and produce an unmanned remote control device to be secretly placed inside the USSR; to produce 4 KH-12 reconnaissance photographing satellites with a high distinguishing rate; to produce 4 all-weather "cricket" satellites equipped with radar picture-forming devices; and to use such equipment in round-the-clock tracking of Soviet strategic mobile targets.

Besides, in the new plan for nuclear operations, counter-measures for the possible establishment of a guided missile defensive network nationwide in the USSR has also been made for the first time; at the same time, studies in the feasibility of creating emergency strategic "crack troops" have also been conducted. Based on the above-mentioned situation, observers believe that the U.S.-USSR nuclear arms race will unfold on a new plane in the 1990s.

**Border Talks With USSR**

*HK1502085290 Beijing XINHUA in English*  
*0846 GMT 15 Feb 90*

["Spokesman on Sino-Soviet Border Troops Reduction Talks"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, February 15 (XINHUA)—Chinese and Soviet representatives are continuing their discussions on the guiding principles concerning the reduction of troops along the Sino-Soviet border areas and the strengthening of mutual trust in the military field, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Spokesman Li Zhaoxing made the remark in response to a reporter's question at the weekly news briefing here this afternoon.

Both sides have taken a "businesslike" and realistic attitude, Li said, adding "we hope that the negotiations will be successful."

### **Superpowers Urged to Destroy Weapons**

*HK1502084890 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0841 GMT 15 Feb 90*

["China Urges Superpowers to Take Lead in Destroying Chemical Weapons"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, February 15 (XINHUA)—China today urged the two superpowers to "take the lead in practical actions" to destroy all the existing chemical weapons.

This was stated by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman at the weekly news briefing here this afternoon when he commented on the bilateral agreement reportedly reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on destroying the bulk of their chemical weapons.

China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, spokesman Li Zhaoxing said.

China hopes that an international convention on this will be concluded by the conference on disarmament in Geneva at an early date so as to remove the immediate and direct threat posed by chemical weapons to the international security, he said.

"The two superpowers that have the largest chemical arsenals bear a special responsibility for the prohibition of chemical weapons and should take the lead in practical actions," he said.

The spokesman said that the key is to thoroughly destroy all the existing chemical weapons and refrain from producing or developing any new-type of chemical weapons.

### **Protracted Local Wars Viewed**

*HK2002090990 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO  
in Chinese 2 Feb 90 p 3*

[Article by Zhu Jun (2612 6874): "Make Adequate Appraisal of Possible Protracted Nature of Local Wars"]

[Text] The study of local warfare should not be overly generalized but should be more concrete and pertinent.

Under our country's conditions local wars can be divided into two categories in terms of the scope of the battlefields and the size of troops involved, namely border wars and regional wars. A so-called border war refers to one being fought in the border areas with a neighboring country. Such a war is normally small in size and involves a comparatively small number of troops. A so-called regional war refers to one we fight to resist the enemies who have invaded a certain region of our country. Because of our country's large territory, a regional war may cover a rather large geographical area. To fight these two types of local wars, especially the regional war, we will have to use

troops from one or two military regions and the state will have to partially mobilize to ensure necessary assistance. At present, one viewpoint holds that a characteristic of the local wars and armed conflicts of contemporary times is that "a major goal is achieved in a short time through rapid and decisive action." In my view there are not full grounds for the generalization that all local wars are wars of quick decision.

In fact, quite a few local wars which occurred during the last decade were not wars of quick decision but protracted wars. Examples can be found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. Although those who launched such military actions tried to achieve quick and decisive results, they could not but become bogged down in long-lasting wars of attrition.

In the Falklands war, Argentina sank and damaged 18 British ships in 74 days. The war cost Britain \$2.16 billion, accounting for 50 percent of Britain's annual reserve. Foreign observers held that if the Argentine side was prepared to fight a protracted war from the very beginning, it would have been hard to predict the result. At least the war would not have ended so quickly.

Therefore, if we do not fully assess the possible protracted nature of a local war and merely prepare ourselves for wars of quick decision, then our war preparations may become seriously unrealistic.

### **XINHUA Discusses NATO-Warsaw 'Open Skies' Pact**

*OW2002003690 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 1353 GMT 13 Feb 90*

["News analysis" by XINHUA reporter Yuan Rongsheng: "The 'Open Skies' Meeting Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] Ottawa, 12 February (XINHUA)—The foreign ministers of 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries will gather in Ottawa, the capital of Canada, from 12 to 28 February to discuss opening up the skies of the member countries of the world's two largest military alliances.

Under the so-called concept of open skies, the member states of an alliance allow their counterparts from another alliance to send unarmed aircraft into their airspace on short notice to monitor their military activities and installations. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact believe that opening up their skies is a measure aimed at enhancing mutual trust between East and West, instead of a part of U.S.-Soviet or East-West disarmament efforts. They also believe that the action can serve as a supplementary verification measure for future disarmament agreements.

Since its proposal by U.S. President George Bush last 12 May, the concept of open skies has quickly won the support of the other NATO member countries and drawn a response from the Warsaw Pact. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze last September formally expressed support for holding an "open skies" meeting.

The Ottawa meeting is a working conference, in which three days of foreign minister-level sessions are followed

by discussions among ordinary government officials. The meeting is designed to understand and resolve the various problems related to open skies. A second meeting, scheduled to be held in April in Budapest, the capital of Hungary, will seek to settle unresolved problems from the Ottawa meeting and to sign a treaty on "open skies."

In preparation for the Ottawa meeting, a Canadian unarmed military airplane stationed in West Germany on 6 January made a trial flight through Hungarian airspace with assistance from the Hungarian Government. Because of its limited ability, Hungary voluntarily gave up its right to make a trial flight through Canadian airspace.

After several rounds of consultation, the NATO member states put forward a "summary of main points" last 15 December to expound their alliance's unified stand on the Ottawa meeting. Other than a brief description by the Soviet Union of its stance, the Warsaw Pact countries have not yet developed a uniform position on the meeting, because of the drastic political changes in Eastern Europe in the second half of last year.

Currently, there are still many differences between the specific positions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The differences lie mainly in the following two areas:

1. They differ on the scope of opening. NATO has called for opening up the airspace of all member countries of the two military alliances. The Soviet Union has contended that the NATO proposal, while covering all Warsaw Pact military bases, does not include the overseas military bases of the NATO countries, particularly the United States (in such countries as Japan and the Philippines), and has called for including the military bases of both alliances throughout the world.

2. They differ on how to make surveillance flights. NATO has suggested that the two military blocs conduct flights separately, with the member states of each bloc making the flights alone or together, and has called for making the intelligence and data collected from such flights the property of each bloc. The Soviet Union has proposed that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact use the same types of aircraft and instruments and make surveillance flights together, and has called for making the intelligence and data so gathered the joint property of both alliances.

Some Western analysts believe that the Soviet Union's joint surveillance proposal was prompted by that country's fears of failing to catch up with Western surveillance equipment and technology and consequently of finding itself in an unfavorable position in this war of intelligence. Soviet diplomats in Canada, however, have denied this, saying that joint surveillance can truly enhance mutual trust between East and West and save money, manpower, and equipment.

#### **Article Discusses 'New Atlantic Doctrine'**

*HK2002073590 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese  
No 2, 16 Jan 90 pp 4-5*

[Article by Wang Haihan (3769 3189 3211): "The 'New Atlantic Doctrine' Put Forward by the United States"]

[Text] The crucial point of the "new Atlantic Doctrine" is to preserve the U.S.' leading role in Europe so that it can control development in Europe. But this will possibly bring about new frictions and contradictions between the United States and Europe, and the United States will not necessarily have its wishes fulfilled.

No sooner had the U.S.-Soviet summit on Malta concluded than Bush rushed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Brussels to brief the NATO allies on his talks with Gorbachev. He gave a speech in which he told his audience that so long as the United States and the NATO allies remain united and preserve their strength, the relationship between the countries on both sides of the Atlantic "will create a new age and a structure of a new Atlantic Doctrine." Several days later, U.S. Secretary of State Baker spent a week visiting several European countries. He gave a detailed account of the "New Atlantic Doctrine" at a club for journalists in West Berlin, claiming that "a new Europe will be built on the basis of the new Atlantic Doctrine."

#### **As the Situation Is Taking a Sharp Turn, the United States Is Burdened With Anxieties**

There are profound reasons for the emergence of the "new Atlantic doctrine" at the present stage.

Currently, new contradictions are mingling with old ones in the international arena, and Europe "has once again become a focal point of global politics." The United States has consistently regarded Europe as a strategic focal point, but its decisive role in Europe is now exposed to danger and challenge from various quarters. The drastic changes in East European countries have caused worries for the United States.

First of all, they are worried that the new situation in East Europe will lead to the disintegration of the Yalta system. The United States believes that the Soviet Union's practical military threat to the West has decreased and the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact military blocs has been markedly defused. At the same time, the United States realizes that the Yalta system, which has maintained order in Europe since World War II, has shown signs of disintegration, and East Europe is in the midst of an upheaval. The United States believes that this new order that is taking over from the old one "is not necessarily a stable or pleasant order."

Second, the United States is worried that the U.S.' traditional leading role in Europe will further weaken for the following reasons: (1) West Europe, with the European Community (EC) as its core, is trying to play a dominant role in the development in East Europe; and (2) since East-West relations have relaxed, the U.S. military presence in Europe is not as significant as it used to be, and West Europe is less dependent on U.S. nuclear protection. As a result, the foundation for the U.S.-West Europe alliance is becoming shaky, and the struggle for and against control of Europe between the United States and West Europe is becoming more bitter. 3) With the constant progress made in efforts to combine European countries into an integrated entity with the EC as its core, "Europe



has become more mature politically and more powerful economically." West Europe will become a more powerful political and economic opponent to the United States.

Third, they are worried that the two Germanys will go ahead with reunification faster than they would like to see. The incident in East Germany rapidly brought the two Germanys closer together. This development was so unexpected that it threw the United States off its guard. The United States is afraid that a unified Germany will change the balance of power in Europe, putting an end to the pattern of two superpowers equally dominating the world, as chartered by the Yalta Agreement.

Many Americans believe that the United States cannot "stand by idly" as the old order in Europe disintegrates. It has to properly handle "the relations between the West and the West [as published]" before it can make new achievements in settling problems concerning the West and the East. It was against this background that the Bush administration came up with the "New Atlantic Doctrine."

#### **Readjust the Policy and Safeguard the Interests**

The "New Atlantic Doctrine" is in reality a U.S. readjusted policy toward Europe. It consists of following main points.

1. Strengthening the existing organizations in the West, especially NATO. At the Malta summit, both leaders agreed that the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will play a stabilizing role in Europe. NATO is important to the United States. It is through NATO that the United States has been able to carry out its strategy and exercise its special leadership over Europe.

Bush assured the West European allies that the United States will keep its influence in Europe, continually station troops in Europe as an important military force, and continually take part in future affairs in Europe and in the common defense of the United States and Europe. Bush emphasized that aside from performing the traditional duty of safeguarding peace in Europe, in the future NATO should become a political setup that is able to build a new safety system for Europe. In carrying out its political strategy, NATO should take further measures on its own initiative "to promote human rights legislation, democracy, and reform in East European countries," making NATO the most effective means "to encourage rapprochement between West and East European countries." The United States also hopes that NATO will turn into a "fire division wall" to contain West Germany.

2. Strengthening the relations between the United States and the EC through the signing of a treaty. The United States is aware that West Europe will succeed in building a big market by 1992, and that is a general course of development that cannot be resisted. West Europe will further build up its economic force and will try to play a political role corresponding to this economic force. The United States realizes that it must set great store by this reality and look upon the EC as an equal political and economic partner. The United States not only maintained that "the EC should open its doors to other countries and

cooperate with them," but also said that it is willing to sign a treaty with the EC to establish a consultation institution. At the annual meeting between the EC and the United States held on 15 December 1989, Baker suggested that the two sides hold more regular talks on foreign policies. By establishing more direct ties with the EC, the United States will enjoy a legitimate status through which it can have a hand in European affairs and be able to exercise greater political influence on the EC, thus preventing the organization from taking economic measures detrimental to the United States. At the same time, since the United States cannot do everything it would like to be able to do to help East Europe on account of insufficient financial resources, the United States hopes it can, by means of the "magnet" of the EC, encourage and speed up the process by which East Europe shifts to a market economy.

3. Upgrading the role played by the EC and making it a bridge to link East and West Europe, thereby breathing new life into the 1976 Final Act of Helsinki. In the past, the United States pressured the Soviet Union on the problem of human rights issues, mainly through the EC, but at present, the United States thinks that the EC has a more important economic and political role to play. Baker maintained that the EC should become "the most important ground for closer East-West cooperation," and the United States should impel the Soviet Union and East European countries to introduce market economy and "free elections" at a greater pace, using the EC as a "diplomatic implement."

4. Advancing four specific principles on reunifying Germany in a bid to control the process of the reunification. West Germany's Chancellor Kohl came up with a 10-point package for the reunification on 28 November 1989, namely, right before the summit was held on Malta, but he spoke evasively on how the FRG would carry out commitments as a member of NATO and the EC and avoided mentioning the border issue. Therefore, Baker reiterated in a speech the United States' four principles, which were put forward on 29 November 1989, on the reunification of Germany, stressing that reunification is not a matter that concerns the German people alone and that the legitimate demands of Europeans, and the right of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France to handle the issue, should be taken into account.

It is thus clear that in coming forward with the "New Atlantic Doctrine," the United States was trying to: Prevent the situation in East Europe from getting out of control; consolidate and develop the achievements of "peaceful evolution" in East Europe; readjust the cooperation between Western countries by means of the existing system; restrain Germany from going ahead too rapidly with its reunification; and develop its relations with the EC so as to protect its political, economic, and military interests and preserve its leading role in Europe.

### It Is Difficult To Iron Out Old and New Differences

The United States' "New Atlantic Doctrine" will inevitably encroach upon the interests of West European countries and intensify the contradictions between the former and the latter. The present indications are that the contradictions are sharpening.

West European countries have been on their guard against the two superpowers making a political deal behind their back, which would infringe upon their interests. Currently, West European countries place greater emphasis on their position on the situation in Europe and are trying to contain and influence the two superpowers. On the eve of the Malta summit, 28 November 1989, 12 EC member states held a special conference to discuss issues in Europe, particularly the East Europe situation, and to coordinate their positions so that they could have a unified attitude toward the future blueprint for Europe, affect and expedite development in Europe, and exert influence on the U.S.-Soviet summit. The strong inclination displayed at the conference to act on their own constitutes a great challenge to the two superpowers, which insist on monopolizing everything in Europe. Henry Bu Lan Deng [1580 5695 4098], a researcher of the U.S. Bu Lu Jin Si [1580 7627 6855 2448] Institute, clearly pointed out: During the "post containment" period, the United States has had many more difficulties in handling its relations with European allies than it has "in handling its relations with the Soviet Union."

Of course, West European countries responded in various ways to the "New Atlantic Doctrine," owing to their different situations and interests. They are all in favor of the policies toward the Soviet Union and East Europe proposed by the doctrine. Britain and France welcome the measures to restrain the process of reunification of Germany, but some countries have reservations about the United States' plan to strengthen NATO's political role. France has clearly indicated it does not agree with entrusting to NATO greater terms of reference. At the meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member states held on 14 December 1989, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dumas said that in the course of building a new Europe, the functions of NATO and the EC should not be mixed up. Clearly a contention between the United States and Europe over the control of Europe is inevitable.

Of the contradictions between the United States and West European countries, those between the United States and the FRG are the sharpest. In the previous stage, the United States had an open dispute with West Germany and other Western allies over the defense of Europe, and the former finally made a concession on the problem of short-range missiles. At present, the United States and the FRG are divided to a great extent over the reunification of Germany. The United States maintains that the reunification should be realized step by step and conducted within the framework of the EC. In putting forward the four principles on the reunification of Germany, Baker expressed discontent with the FRG for its failure to notify the United States before it published its 10-point program. Later Baker paid a visit to the GDR, and U.S., Soviet, British,

and French ambassadors held talks in West Berlin over the reunification. This made the FRG angry. Some Americans are worried that U.S. attempts "to satisfy the Soviet Union's demand by hampering the reunification of Germany" will poison future relations between the United States and the FRG and intensify their contention and friction over the reunification issue.

In addition, a rift has developed in the "special relations" between the United States and the United Kingdom. In his talks with NATO countries, Bush urged the EC to promote evolution in East Europe by using "their role as a magnet" and realize the integration as soon as possible. The United Kingdom was unhappy with this. To safeguard its vital interests, the United Kingdom maintains that it should establish ties with the EC gradually and in due course. Again, in the wake of the summit on Malta, Bush met with FRG Chancellor Kohl before anyone else, changing the United States' usual practice of attaching the greatest importance to its relations with the United Kingdom. This has become the subject of much discussion by the media in the West. Some people believe that this indicates an end to the "special relations" between the two.

On top of these contradictions, the United States and West European countries are also greatly split over the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. If the two sides should fail to readjust their positions properly, their differences will prevent the East and West from reaching an agreement.

To sum up, the United States is trying to bring the developments in Europe into its planned orbit by means of the "New Atlantic Doctrine" and commit West European countries to following its policies toward the Soviet Union and East Europe. However, it is not known whether the development in Europe will proceed in line with the United States' wishes, or whether the United States will be able to preserve and develop its relations with Western allies in the course of more frequent frictions and readjustments. What is certain is that relations between the United States and Europe will undergo constant and complicated changes.

### East, West Differences on 'Open Skies' Issues Noted

HK2202045990 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese  
17 Feb 90 p 4

["Roundup" by staff reporter Guo Wenfu (6753 2429 4395): "New Area in Disarmament Talks"]

[Text] Ottawa, 13 February—After two days of strenuous work, the foreign ministers of 23 countries of the two big military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—basically achieved consensus today on mutually opening their skies to let the other side's planes carry out surveillance flights. They will also hold the next round of negotiations in Budapest in May this year to solve the remaining problems to facilitate the signing of the open skies treaty.

So-called open skies means letting unarmed military planes of the other side enter a state's own airspace on short notice to monitor relevant military activities and

military facilities. There has never been such a practice since the establishment of the two military blocs. In the period of mutual antagonism, to achieve the aim of spying on the other side's military targets, both sides resorted first to reconnaissance planes and then to satellites. In disarmament talks, both sides must have an accurate idea of conditions concerning the other side's military strength and military activities. Surveillance overflights can make up for what is lacking in spy satellites. Therefore, open skies will help toward an accurate assessment of the other side's strength in disarmament talks.

The "open skies" conference held recently in Ottawa is a working conference. The aim is to solve relevant knotty problems in opening up the countries' respective skies, in order to establish mutual trust and to prevent shock attacks and various mishaps.

Realizing the opening of skies and letting the other side make surveillance flights over a country's airspace calls for resolution of a series of complicated concrete problems. As far as the contents of the drafts of the agreement respectively promulgated by both sides today are concerned, the main contents of the agreement are as follows: What kinds of planes are to be used and who is to fly these planes; the number of flights by both sides and the allocation of flight quotas; the arrangement of the scope of flights and routes; stipulations for the sensors used on planes; how to use and share acquired information and data; concrete flight arrangements; the responsibilities and obligations of both sides; and so forth.

Conditions concerning the conference in the past two days show that despite both sides expressing the intention in principle to sign an agreement as quickly as possible, some differences still exist on some problems. First, the Warsaw Pact's program calls for extending the scope of openness to the sea, or monitoring naval activities, and to space, or monitoring arms race conditions in space. This suggestion met with U.S. opposition. But if this suggestion were accepted, it would be a matter for after the opening up of the skies. Therefore, it does not interfere with the current effort to reach agreement. Second, the Soviet Union suggested extending the scope of air surveillance to U.S. bases in third countries outside NATO member countries. This idea also was turned down by the United States because there was no way to negotiate this question with third countries. In addition, the Soviet side hoped to organize a flight team for common use and to use common devices to carry out surveillance flights. The NATO side did not agree with this view. The United States suggested that the data acquired by a country's surveillance flights be shared only by member nations of the group. The Soviet Union wanted it to be shared by all the relevant signatories. There are some other disagreements.

Most of the medium-sized and small countries of the two big groups assume a relatively positive attitude toward the negotiations. This agreement can give them an opportunity to take a direct part in disarmament activities.

To prepare for this conference, Canada and Hungary had specially arranged for a test flight in Hungary's airspace on

6 January this year. A Canadian unarmed military plane passed over Czechoslovakia to carry out a surveillance flight of about three hours over Hungary, in order to supply necessary data for the conference.

The "open skies" idea was first put forward by U.S. President Eisenhower in 1955, but was rejected by the Soviet leaders at the time. Last May, U.S. President Bush again put forward this suggestion and had it approved by NATO allies as a formal proposal. Later, it very quickly received a positive response from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Last September both the Soviet Union and the United States decided officially to call such a conference to create a new area for promoting the process of disarmament. The convening of the conference with an agreement reached in principle will have a definite stimulating effect on future disarmament negotiations.

### **Military Groups Resume Exchange Visits**

*OW2402084990 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0825 GMT 24 Feb 90*

[Text] Beijing, February 24 (KYODO)—China and the Soviet Union have resumed military exchanges for the first time in about three decades, Eastern bloc sources said Saturday.

The sources said military experts from the two nations met in Moscow last November and in Beijing this month.

The meetings were held as part of the bilateral diplomatic and military experts forum established when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing last May.

Military exchanges between the two countries were suspended after bilateral relations plummeted in the 1960s resulting in clashes over the ownership of a tiny island on the Amur River along the Sino-Soviet border.

The military experts' panel was established to discuss troop reductions along the border in order to restore mutual trust.

The sources said the Soviet delegation which attended the Beijing session February 8-22 noted with satisfaction that mutual troop reductions will contribute to economic development of both countries and help expand trade across the border.

The delegation, which observed Chinese military exercises, pointed out that China's People's Liberation Army equipped with electronic equipment has improved its quality to international levels, the sources said.

Both sides agreed to continue exchanges of military experts in the future, they said.

### **Qian Qichen Remarks at Disarmament Conference**

#### **Speaks on War Prevention**

*OW2702211390 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1534 GMT 27 Feb 90*

[Text] Geneva, February 27 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reaffirmed here on Tuesday that the

Chinese Government opposed all kinds of arms race and would strive for disarmament.

All kinds of arms race, whatever category of weapons it may involve, be it on land or at sea, on earth or in outer space, should be halted, he said.

Speaking at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Qian emphasized the Chinese positions on major fields of disarmament.

—On nuclear disarmament, Mr. Qian said, the United States and the Soviet Union which possess the largest nuclear arsenals should assume a special responsibility and obligation to take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically cut all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad.

China hopes that the two superpowers will through negotiations effectively cut at least 50 percent of their enormous nuclear arsenals, including sea- and air-launched cruise missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons, and proceed on this basis to cut by a bigger margin their nuclear weapons.

—On the prevention of nuclear war, China believes that if all countries possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that in itself will be a highly effective measure for the prevention of nuclear war and a powerful impetus to the nuclear disarmament process.

China proposes that at the conference on disarmament, negotiations should be started at the earliest date for the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons.

It is high time to consider another important measure for the prevention of nuclear war, i.e. all nuclear-weapon states that have deployed nuclear weapons abroad, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, should withdraw all these weapons to their own territories.

—On the prevention of nuclear proliferation, China does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation. In its cooperation with other countries in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, China has adopted a responsible attitude, requiring the recipient countries of its nuclear export to accept IAEA safeguards and ensuring that its own nuclear import is for peaceful purposes. At the same time, China is opposed to the practice of going all out for the nuclear arms race both in quantity and quality while imposing unreasonable restrictions on international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation.

—On nuclear test ban, the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted the most nuclear tests, amounting to about 1,600 to date, therefore, they have the obligation to take the lead in halting all nuclear tests and carrying out nuclear disarmament so as to create conditions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

China has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence towards nuclear tests and has conducted only a very limited number of nuclear tests.

—On conventional disarmament, the early conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and the other member states of the two major military alliances on drastic conventional forces reductions will contribute to peace and security in Europe and the world as a whole.

—On the arms race in outer space and at sea, progress in nuclear and conventional disarmament has made disarmament in outer space and at sea an increasingly prominent issue.

—On chemical weapons ban, this year and the next will be of vital importance to the negotiations for a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

The key to the final solution of the problem of chemical weapons lies in the total destruction of the existing chemical weapons at the earliest date by the countries possessing the largest chemical arsenals, and moreover in their refraining from producing or developing new types of chemical weapons.

China favours an effective, reasonable and feasible verification regime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the meantime, China maintains that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its possible abuse must be strictly guarded against.

—On international weapons transfer, China has always been prudent and responsible towards the export of weapons, and the volume of such export is extremely limited.

China strictly follows the following principles: First, it should be conducive to the strengthening of the legitimate defence capabilities of the countries concerned.

Secondly, it should be conducive to the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in the regions concerned.

And thirdly, the export of weapons is not to be used as a means to interfere in other countries' internal affairs.

China is in favour of reasonable regulation and restriction of international arms transfer. If the United States, the Soviet Union and some NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, whose arms transfers account for over 90 percent of the world's total, can take concrete and effective self-restraining measures, it will undoubtedly contribute to the enhancement of world peace and security.

"A brief review of the realities in the field of disarmament gives us enough reason to conclude that the world today is neither trouble-free nor tranquil and that it is no time to sit back and relax," Mr Qian said.

He urged all countries to bear the heavy responsibilities for safeguarding peace and striving for disarmament.

**Qian Qichen Urges U.S., USSR Base Removal***OW2702125290 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1230 GMT 27 Feb 90*

[Text] Geneva, February 27 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on Tuesday urged the United States and the Soviet Union to withdraw all their armed forces stationed abroad and to remove all their military bases from foreign soil.

Speaking at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Qian said that the withdrawal of troops and removal of military bases from abroad by the two superpowers would ensure a correct orientation for the disarmament process.

"Now it is high time to drastically reduce all troops stationed, military bases established and all types of weapons deployed on foreign soil until their complete removal," he said.

The Chinese foreign minister also requested that all U.S.-Soviet disarmament agreement should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability without prejudice to the interests of any third country.

He said that the troops slated for reduction should be dissolved and not transferred to any other place and that all the weapons and equipment thus cut should be destroyed, dismantled, or turned to civilian purposes, and should not be integrated into other weapon systems or redeployed in other regions.

Criticizing the armed invasion of Panama by the United States not long ago, Mr. Qian stressed that all foreign aggressor troops and occupation armies anywhere in the world should be withdrawn immediately without any preconditions.

He also made it clear that China had never set up any military base or stationed any soldier outside its territory.

**Characteristics of Future War Pattern Discussed***HK2802101490 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO  
in Chinese 9 Feb 90 p 3*

[Article by Liu Zhiwei (0491 1807 0251): "A General Forecast of the War Pattern in the 1990's"]

[Text] In the long chain of historical development, the realistic link is naturally tied to the future link. The realistic link determines, to a certain degree, the direction of the future link. It provides people with a basis for thought in describing the future. Therefore, to correctly predict the future, people must first understand history and reality.

In the 1990's, in what direction will the war pattern evolve? When we give serious thought to the Falklands war between Britain and Argentina with the demonstration of sophisticated guided weapons at their best, to the Bekaa war between Israel and Syria with the electronic equipment stealing the scene, to the U.S. air attack on Libya taxing the brain of the White House, and to the Iran-Iraq war ending up eventually with its conclusion with peace

talks after eight years of bitter fighting; then, we can roughly portray the outline of the future war pattern.

The future war pattern will take on two fundamental characteristics: First, an emphasis will be placed on "attacks on targeted points." Due to rapid scientific and technical growth, various sophisticated guided weapons have gradually formed giant weapons families. They will play a main role in the stage of war in the next century. Therefore, the war pattern will bid farewell to the pattern of attack "with scanty results from a wide sown area" marked with artillery fire and intensive bombing. Both sides on the offensive and the defensive can resort to sophisticated guided weapons making the enemy's vitals the direct target of attack, "pinpointing" his tender spot and bringing everything else under control. Second, an emphasis will be placed on "soft attack." Human society has entered the era of information. As a "soft part" of the war machinery, the information system has played an increasingly important part among various factors representing the strength of war. It will therefore become the focus of attack by both sides on the offensive or defensive. Meanwhile, given increasing progress in information technology and its transformation from communications safeguard equipment into the "combat weapons" of both the offensive and defensive sides, "soft means" will become an important factor in the success or failure of war. Then, people will find it very difficult to describe the fierceness of fighting in terms of "heavy smoke of gunpowder" and "rumbling sound of gunfire."

The future war will be guided by three fundamental principles. 1) Strategy. The future war, large or small, long or short in duration, will be more strictly subject to state strategic control, no matter what the means resorted to. The scope of "a general fighting far away with orders from the ruler incapable of being acted upon," as an ancient saying goes, will become increasingly narrow. The era of "military fighting going off like an unbridled wild horse on the run at the beginning of a war with even an influence on the state's strategic trend will be a thing of the past. [quotation marks as received] That in a future war, a company unit's tactical action can become a topic of talk at a state summit conference will no longer make people fuss about it. 2) Given limits. In future wars, a local war subject to many limitations will take the place of an unrestricted large-scale war to become the main pattern of a future war. Of these many limitations, the most fundamental is the limited aim of war. The threat of the enemy's survival will not be sought. Instead, through the use of the means of war in a restrained and flexible way, the enemy is forced to readjust or change his given policy to suit a country's own desire, thus giving rise to the limitations of the use of fighting strength, the limitations of the means of wars, the limitations of the space scope of war, and the limitations of duration of war. 3) Accuracy. Given strict control from state strategy and checks and balances among the international community, the rhythm of state strategy must be played with great accuracy, be it the use of fighting strength or the means of war, the space scope of war, or the duration of war. Anything overdone can be a big worry to military commanders. The rapid development and wide use of

modern weapons and technical equipment will also naturally make future wars increasingly precise and accurate in regard to analysis in making policy decisions, giving commands and exercising control, tracing feedback, and a series of other links. The description of the future war as "a timetable-type war" will no longer be treated by people as something fabulous from the "Arabian Nights."

**Foreign Ministry on Japanese Defense Strengthening**

*OW0103092290 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0856 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Text] Beijing, March 1 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today that with regard to Japan's effort to strengthen its defence capabilities,

China's position is known to all: China hopes that Japan will act prudently in view of the historical lessons.

The spokesman made the remark at the weekly news briefing here this afternoon when asked about China's position on disarmament in Asia since both the United States and the Soviet Union reportedly expressed that they will reduce their troops in Asia and that the United States has asked Japan to share more defence duties.

The spokesman said that the military presence of the two superpowers and their arms race in the Asia-Pacific region constitute a major source of tension in that region.

"We have consistently urged them to stop the arms race, including their rivalry for maritime superiority, to reduce and withdraw as soon as possible all their military forces stationed on foreign soil, and to dismantle their overseas military bases," the spokesman said.

## SOUTH KOREA

### CHOSON ILBO Views Arms Control Symposium

*SK1102111190 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
7 Feb 90 p 3*

[Editorial: "Our Expectation From a Symposium on Arms Control"]

[Text] A symposium on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and arms control issues reportedly will be held, with scholars from the North and South of Korea and the United States attending. Although they are private citizens, these scholars—the North Korean delegate is a vice foreign minister, the U.S. delegate John Lewis is director of the Institute of International Strategy at Stanford University, and the Korean delegate Chong Chong-uk is a professor and the director of the Institute of International Affairs at Seoul National University—will certainly be maintaining close consultations and exchanging information with their respective governments. This being the case, the symposium can be said to be of great significance.

First of all, it is fortunate that North Korea has decided to send its delegate to this symposium. Whatever goal it may seek by sending its delegate to the symposium, regardless of whether it seeks to have direct negotiations with the United States or whether it means to broadly advertise its call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, which has long been its principled position, it is an entirely different thing. What is important is the fact that North Korea is now resolved to discuss arms control, in academic terms, with both Korea and the United States. We believe this is the same as saying that "a good start is half the battle."

The North Korean scholar may repeat what North Korea has asserted time after time. The question is what our side will say. We say this because, regrettably, our government does not seem to have worked out any unified sort of views or consensus on such things as discussing arms control with North Korea.

It is simply because North Korea sees the presence of U.S. troops in the South as "a stumbling block" to reunification, the sort of reunification it seeks to achieve, that for decades it has consistently called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.

Although the military and the government authorities' repeated reference to it in the past has led us to form a habit of ignoring the fact, North Korea's preparedness to mount a surprise strike against us is grave and awesome. On the face of it, the armed forces of the North and South deployed in areas along the truce line appear to be well balanced.

This notwithstanding, the North Korean side's deployment of armed forces in areas along the truce line is only for diversionary purposes. Its armed forces deployed in the proximate rear areas and in the Western front—which has Seoul, our capital, in point-blank range—are particularly formidable. About 50 mechanized brigades, nearly 4,000 large-caliber self-propelled guns, and another nearly 5,000

tanks deployed there are ready to roll over through the middle of the truce line the moment U.S. troops withdraw.

A change in the deployment of the North Korean armed forces that are massed in areas immediately north of Seoul should be made a top-priority condition for arms control talks between the North and South. The change in the deployment of the North Korean armed forces will inevitably force North Korea to change its strategy and tactics against the South. Only when North Korea effects such a change in its deployment of the armed forces can we feel at ease even if U.S. troops withdraw from our country. If North Korea changes its deployment of forces and its strategy and tactics, it could be the same as embarking upon the road of peaceful coexistence with the South. This is the concession that we must extract from North Korea.

In a sense, North Korea is believed to be under pressure to change its strategy as such. According to statistics released by North Korea, it has continued scaling down the defense expenditures in the budget over the past 10 years. Nevertheless, the size of defense expenditures in proportion to the gross national product [GNP] has kept rising. On the contrary, our country's defense expenditures have kept shrinking in proportion to the GNP, although they have been increased year after year. Our country's GNP is over \$160 billion, whereas that of North Korea is more or less \$20 billion.

If under these circumstances the North and South continue the arms race, North Korea will find it impossible to avoid ruining its "national economy." It is on the basis of such a situation that we should seize the initiative for arms control negotiations. Conversely, we should never provide North Korea with an excuse or opportunity for mounting a surprise attack against the South by being persuaded into accepting its call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops or the theory of reunification, the central theme of which is to appeal to national self-respect.

Nor do we have to vainly suggest that we help North Korea. The notion of economic cooperation with North Korea also sounds hollow. North Korea should be made to reduce its armed forces before anything. The scholars from our side who are to participate in the symposium on arms control are urged to bear this in mind.

## THAILAND

### HUMMV-Mounted TOW in Marine Inventory

*90WC0044A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai  
22-28 Jan 90 p 11*

[Text] In today's column, readers can see some fearsome pictures, that is, a new model "Hummer" jeep, which is called an "HUMMV" vehicle. This vehicle already has a very strange shape, resembling a fortress. (There are several models of this vehicle, as this column has reported before.) This HUMMV vehicle is mounted with a TOW anti-tank missile. This missile is well known in Thailand, because the Thai military has been using it for more than 10 years. It is in the same class as the Dragon anti-tank missile. We mounted TOW-1 missiles mainly on M-113

armored personnel carriers (A.P.C.). Most of these vehicles were assigned to cavalry divisions and the infantry divisions assigned to the Burapha Force, which is stationed along the Cambodian border. Later on, we obtained the TOW-2, which has a much greater range. These, too, were mounted on armored personnel carriers.

The HUMMV vehicle shown here [photo not published] is a new model that was deployed among U.S. military units just recently (beginning with the marines). The first of these vehicles obtained by the Thai military were assigned to the marines in 1988. These are TOW-mounted vehicles just like the vehicles used by the U.S. Marine Corps. It can be said that our marines have the same modern equipment as the best marines in the world.

Last year's calendar of the company that makes the HUMMV showed a picture of a TOW-mounted HUMMV. The explanation accompanying the picture clearly stated that this vehicle is used by Thai marines. This shows that Thailand's Marine Corps is equipped with the most modern weapons available. The pictures shown here show TOW-mounted HUMMV vehicles at the Saemsan Marine Camp in Sattahip, Chonburi Province.

#### **Laser-Guided Bomb in Air Force Inventory**

*90WC0044B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai  
15-21 Jan 90 p 11*

[Text] In the last issue, there was a report about a laser-guided bomb in the inventory of the air force and which the air force is prepared to use. This bomb was used during the fighting at Ban Rom Klao. In this issue, I would like to provide some details about this type of bomb. It is 119 inches long and weighs 2,052 pounds. It is 18 inches in diameter and has "hu kwaen" 14 inches. It has the bomb body and warhead of the MK-84 and so it is called the MK-84 laser-guided bomb. Besides the actual bomb, it has an MAU 169 C/B type computer control group, an air foil group, or wing assembly, and a fuse device.

This laser-guided bomb requires a target seeking group, which has a laser target designator set, or LTDS. This is mounted aboard an aircraft whose duty is to point out the target. Aircraft equipped with this type of bomb can fly to the target area and drop the bomb from high altitude. This protects the aircraft from ground AAA fire. The bomb is 90 percent accurate. After the bomb has been released, the directional fins are opened by a control mechanism.

The target designator set shoots a laser beam to the target with a strength of 1.06 microns. The guidance system in the warhead receives the laser beam reflected from the target, and the mechanism adjusts the trajectory to keep

the bomb headed toward the target. This inclination cannot have an angle of more than 20 degree off perpendicular to the ground. As for the head and tail fuses, the FMU-81/B model is used.

#### **PRC-Origin Tanks in Khon Kaen Unit**

*90WC0044C Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai  
15-21 Jan 90 pp 9, 10*

[Text] The Th-30, or T-69-2 tanks purchased from China, which have been deployed in the 4th King's Guard Cavalry Regiment, will be the main weapon of the 3d Cavalry Division, which will establish its headquarters at the Nam Phong Camp in Khon Kaen Province. As LAK THAI reported previously, this Chinese-made tank is an older model, because China has already developed a new tank. The new model is similar to the older model in almost all respects. The only difference is that the firing system has been improved, and the targeting system uses newer technology. To fire accurately, the Th-30 must first stop and then fire. It has great firepower, but if it fires while moving, the recoil and the ups and downs of the terrain make it difficult to hit the target. This is different from the American-made Stingray tank, which is now being deployed here. The Stingray has a special control system. Regardless of the terrain or whether the target is to the left or right, the gunner can keep the gun pointed in the direction of the target at all times. Thus, the gun is highly accurate even when the tank is moving. The fire control system on China's new tank has been improved, and the gun can lock on target. But we will have to wait and see how it compares with the "prototype."

#### **Thailand Denies Possession of Chemical Weapons**

*BK2102025890 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia  
in English 1500 GMT 20 Feb 90*

[Text] A BUENOS AIRES HERALD article written by Nicolas Coles published in Argentina dated on 4 February accused Thailand of being one of the countries in Asia which possess chemical weapons. The fact is that Thailand does not possess nor intends to have in possession any chemical weapons and has strictly abided by the 1925 Geneva protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of [word indistinct] poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare to which she has been a party since 1931.

Thailand is also aware of the ineffectiveness of the said protocol in preventing widespread use of chemical weapons and has thus joined the international community in supporting the work of the UN subsidiary conference on disarmament in Geneva to conclude a comprehensive convention on the banning of chemical weapons to supplement the protocol at the earliest date possible.



## INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

**Horn Accepts NATO Role for United Germany***LD0902193190 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Canada is ready to provide wide-ranging economic support to Hungary. At the same time, it views the political and economic tension in Eastern Europe with no small degree of concern. This is what Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, who is now holding talks in Canada, told MTI. As he said, he told his hosts that the changes which are under way in Hungary cannot be reversed, and he trusts in success with regard to the other reform countries.

Gyula Horn asked Canada to mediate with the other Western countries on easing the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] list of developed technology whose export is banned. The Hungarian foreign minister also said that our country accepts the NATO membership of a united Germany, if the current, eastern part is a weapon-free zone.

**SPD Minister Observes Soviet, GDR Military***LD0902163590 East Berlin ADN International  
Service in German 1502 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Minister Dr Walter Romberg [Social Democratic Party] visited members of the Western Group of the USSR Armed Forces and the GDR National People's Army (NVA) at the Sandau and Klietz training grounds today. A troop exercise that has been notified to all CSCE states is being held there until 11 February.

Major General Konstantin V. Bogdanov informed the GDR minister about the aims, phases, and course of the exercise so far. Afterward, Dr Romberg observed troop maneuvers. In a talk with the first deputy commander in chief and chief of staff of the Western Group, Lieutenant General Valeriy Fursin, the minister familiarized himself with the tasks and situation of the Western Group. He expressed a desire for more human contacts between the GDR citizens and Soviet soldiers.

On the same day, Dr Romberg visited the 2d Motorized Infantry Regiment of the NVA to familiarize himself with the defense mission during the exercise.

**Romanian Delegate Addresses Geneva Arms Talks***AU1002183790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
1613 GMT 10 Feb 90*

["On the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, February 10 (ROMPRES)—Romania militates for the soonest possible conclusion of an international convention on stopping the manufacture of chemical weapons and completely destroying the existing stockpiles under a strict and efficient international control. It no longer makes the liquidation of chemical weapons contingent upon the simultaneous achievement of nuclear disarmament (as it was done before, owing to an absurd indication given by the ex-dictator).

Such points were given by the Romanian foreign minister when setting forth the stance of the Romanian delegation at the current session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

**Keleti on Cooperation With Romanian Army***LD1202021290 Budapest Television Service  
in Hungarian 1900 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Interview with Colonel Gyorgy Keleti by unidentified reporter in the Budapest Television studio in Budapest; date not given]

[Text] [Reporter] Laszlo Tokes went to Romania today, and he was not alone in going there. He was accompanied by Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, who flew there overnight and is now sitting with me in the studio. What was the objective of this lightning visit, on your part?

[Keleti] Basically that we would like a personal meeting between the two ministers soon, that is, between the Hungarian and [Romanian] defense ministers. Thus, I took a personal message from Minister Ferenc Karpati, which is part of preparing for the talks.

[Reporter] I have read in the papers and seen on "The Week" program that power is increasingly slipping into the Army's hands. What did you sense?

[Keleti] I was in Bucharest a few weeks ago. At that time there was an enormous number of soldiers on the streets, there were tanks, there were control points. My impressions today were that these control points have ceased to exist; only around the headquarters of the National Salvation Front did I see some armored units. Even the defense minister's headquarters is not guarded by the 10-12 tanks, which were still there a few weeks ago.

[Reporter] Why is it important for you, or for us, that the two armies should be in such close contact?

[Keleti] I feel we have always endeavored to have close relations with our neighbors, and now there is an excellent opportunity for a true relationship of comrades-in-arms to take shape between the Hungarian People's Army and the Romanian Army, which would serve the interests of both peoples.

[Reporter] So there is no special need for this, owing to the political situation?

[Keleti] There really are interesting situations in Transylvania, as we saw on "The Week" program. I think level-headedness, tolerance is very much needed by both sides so that this antagonism which has developed through several decades, which was formed by one person, should be eased. I do not think it would be necessary for the Army to intervene, for this. Level-headedness, calm is necessary. Today I met Lajos Demeny and Geza Domokos, we had a friendly discussion. They, as well, profess this and would like to realize this.

[Reporter] Mr Colonel, thank you for coming to the studio.

## Agreement Extends Time for Troop Withdrawal

### 'Combat Units' Out by Year's End

AU1302125490 Paris AFP in English 1238 GMT  
13 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 13 (AFP)—Czechoslovakia has agreed to extend its deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops beyond the end of this year, after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev intervened personally in the negotiations, a foreign ministry spokesman announced Tuesday.

The departure of Soviet "combat units" will take place before the end of the year but support and logistic units will not withdraw until next year, spokesman Lubomir Dobrovsky said.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Party organ, SVOBODNE SLOVO, said Saturday that 1,700 trains of 35 coaches would be needed for the transport of the 75,000 Soviet soldiers and their material.

The Soviet troops, which were deployed in August 1968, have 1,200 tanks, 146 helicopters, 77 aircraft and 2,500 vehicles and troop transporters. All this equipment, excluding the aircraft, will be loaded onto trains near Soviet military bases, the paper said quoting Czechoslovak Defence Minister Milan Vacek.

The paper noted that all the convoys would have to go through Cierna nad Tisou station in eastern Slovakia for a change of bogies because of the difference in gauge between Czechoslovak and Soviet railways.

Technical resources could cope with no more than four convoys a day, or 140 wagons. But the daily said "a year would be enough" to complete the operation.

The second round of negotiations on the withdrawal on February 8 and 9 was adjourned and talks were to resume this week in Moscow at expert level.

The main Soviet bases are in northern Bohemia near Ceska Lipa and Teplice, north of Prague between Mlada Boleslav and Milovice airport, northern Moravia at Olomouc, central Slovakia at Zvolen and at Kosice in eastern Slovakia.

### Spokesman Discusses Transport Problems

LD1302204490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1730 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Immediately after the news conference by the president of the Republic, the press spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lubos Dobrovsky, met with journalists.

He confirmed that the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia and that therefore, there will be none here in the future. Nevertheless, there are some problems connected with this withdrawal and its date, in particular transport problems. The Vienna talks will not have an effect on this withdrawal. Lubos Dobrovsky expressed appreciation for the significance of yesterday's message by Mikhail Gorbachev to Vaclav Havel which helps to explain the reasons why the Soviet side is doing so

much to extend the date of the final withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovak territory. He continued:

[Begin Dobrovsky recording] In any event, in the talks we wish to achieve, as far as possible, the departure of all fighting units so that our date, the end of the year 1990, is not exceeded by too large a margin. We also hope to do this so that the rest of what remains—that is, the noncombatant installations, are removed naturally also as soon as possible. However, we hope this is done in such a way as to ensure that the ecological damage that is taking place shall, we say now, no longer take place. I believe that this is very hopeful and very realistic. [end recording]

Lubos Dobrovsky said that an agreement was reached which stipulates, above all, that those military units to be withdrawn this month will stop their exercise activity. The agreement also stipulates that the Soviet side join in working out a special agreement in which all damage proved to have been caused by the troops, their exercise activity, their nonrespect of certain hygiene and ecology regulations, will be paid for by the Soviet Union. Problems connected with a great number of purchases made by Soviet soldiers in our country before their departure are also being discussed.

### Discussion in Ottawa

LD1402094190 Prague CTK in English 0750 GMT  
14 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa, February 14 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze met here last night in the framework of the "Open Skies" conference for talks on a Soviet troops withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory.

Eduard Shevardnadze explained the difficulties that the Soviet Union has with providing social security to members of the Soviet Army after the withdrawal, and promised that the Soviet side will send a written statement on the proposals of the Czechoslovak authorities.

### Hungary Proposes Troop Reductions at Vienna Talks

LD1302213190 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] At the Vienna armed forces reduction talks, Hungary has proposed that the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states should not be allowed to station more than 225,000 troops beyond their borders. Even out of this number, only 195,000 at most should be permitted in Central Europe. In the event of the proposal being adopted, the Soviet Union would have to withdraw 330,000 and the United States 80,000 troops.

At the Vienna armed forces reduction talks, this was the first time that an initiative has been submitted not by one of the alliance systems but by a single state, in this case the Hungarian state. The Hungarian concepts take the NATO standpoint into consideration. On one point, however, they diverge from it; namely, that a commitment to

limiting the stationing of troops abroad should be undertaken not only by the two big powers, but by the other countries as well.

### **Warsaw Pact Working Meeting Held in Sofia**

#### **Stockholm Conference Documents Viewed**

*AU1402194690 Sofia Domestic Service  
in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 14 Feb 90*

[Text] Representatives of the General Staffs of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states held a working meeting in Sofia today. They exchanged views on the practical implementation of the Stockholm Conference documents on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

#### **Pact Army Chief Lushev Meets Dzhurov**

*AU1402213690 Sofia Domestic Service  
in Bulgarian 2100 GMT 14 Feb 90*

[Text] Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, arrived today in Sofia. The visitor is already holding talks with Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense. Soviet Ambassador Viktor Sharapov is present at the meeting.

#### **Lukanov Receives Lushev**

*AU1502101190 Sofia Domestic Service  
in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] On 15 February, Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, received Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense, attended the meeting.

#### **Mladenov Receives Lushev**

*AU1502104990 Sofia Domestic Service  
in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] On 15 February, Petur Mladenov, chairman of the State Council, received Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. Earlier, Petr Lushev was received by Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers. Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defense, took part in the meetings.

#### **Lukanov Confirms Pact Support**

*AU1502170090 Sofia BTA in English  
1509 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] Sofia, February 15 (BTA)—Mr Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, today received Army General Petr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member Nations.

On behalf of the government he confirmed Bulgaria's policy of active participation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and full support of the member countries for

activating the processes of disarmament and the establishment of a new climate of confidence and mutual cooperation.

### **U.S. Draft Military Budget Criticized**

*AU1402212790 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 12 Feb 90 p 2*

[Franz Knipping editorial: "Bush Went on Maneuvers"]

[Text] Dressed in a brown-green camouflage jacket, George Bush went on maneuvers. In the Mojave Desert, between Las Vegas and Los Angeles, soldiers practiced what has long since become inconceivable, namely a Soviet invasion of the FRG from GDR territory. The U.S. President talked to the "dead" on both sides, warned against self-complacency, and called on everybody to stay on the alert. Subsequently, he demonstratively visited the Livermore laboratories, where the concept and the defense missiles for SDI—the Star Wars program—are developed. In a speech, which was broadcast from the headquarters of the Air Command in Omaha, he announced that, irrespective of current disarmament talks with the USSR, the modernization of long-range nuclear missiles must be promoted.

Bush's spectacular appearance was intended to campaign for his administration's draft budget for 1991, which has been submitted to Congress in Washington. The budget of the Pentagon uses up about one-quarter of the budget. Compared to the current fiscal year, a two-percent cut in real terms is planned for the next budget, the reason for which is a reduced military threat from the USSR, which reduced its defense spending by 8.2 percent this year. The United States wants to respond to this by reducing its troops by no more than 38,000 men (compared to the entire strength of 2 million) and by closing down 12 military bases abroad.

However, the administration calls for considerable additional means for the continuation of several very costly sophisticated armament projects. The SDI space armament program is to receive an additional \$900 million; the construction of another five strategic B-2 Stealth bombers has been requested, the \$5.5 billion for which are a lot more than the money that is to go to all socio-political projects that have been initiated by the White House; the development and the construction of mobile, land-based intercontinental missiles is to be continued, whereas it is intended to increase by 400 percent the means for the follow-up system of the nuclear Lance missiles, which are stationed in the FRG.

Hopes for a "peace dividend" in the shape of drastic cuts in military spending remain unfulfilled for the time being. Yet Congress will have the last word.

### **Spokesman Calls Open Skies Agreement 'Positive'**

*LD1502221390 Belgrade TANJUG in English  
1900 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] Belgrade, February 15 (TANJUG)—The Open Skies agreement signed by the foreign ministers of NATO

and Warsaw Treaty countries in Ottawa is a positive development, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman Ivo Vajgl said here today.

The agreement permits reconnaissance planes of the two blocs to fly over each other's territories.

Recalling that the reaching of understanding on the bloc basis has deficiencies, Vajgl expressed hope that the other member countries of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation will also be covered by the agreement.

### Ministry Says NATO Expansion 'Unrealistic'

*LD2002101190 East Berlin ADN International  
Service in German 0924 GMT 20 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Both the expansion of NATO's sphere of responsibility up to the Oder-Neisse line and the incorporation of the National People's Army (NVA), part of the military potential of the Warsaw Pact, into NATO are unrealistic and must be prevented, according to a statement made today by the GDR Ministry of Defense. A concept worked out on behalf of the GDR Government on the growing together of the two German states and on the prospects and development of their armed forces states: Unless this process is bound in the European security structures and linked to a guarantee against the endangering of peace and threats to neighboring peoples, a German federal state (federation) has no historical prospects.

The GDR Ministry of Defense is guided by the fact that in a confederation of the two German states and a further existence of the two blocks, extracting them from their alliances is similarly not a task that offers a realistic solution. Institutionalizing the process of the CSCE and disbanding the alliances is seen as the most important security prerequisite for the German federation. In this framework, some forces of the NVA could keep their place as a component of the future federal army of the German federal state. After the People's Chamber elections, the military of the two German states must deal in joint responsibility with these problems that are so important for the people.

### U.S. Strategic Study 'Guided' by Arms Industry

*AU2102130490 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG  
in German 19 Feb 90 p 1*

[Christa Schaffmann commentary: "How Long Will the Old Thinking Continue?"]

[Text] After the Ottawa conference, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher spoke of a new dimension of confidence building. The man with a sure sense of what is politically feasible sees the chance of turning 1990 into the year of disarmament. Things in Vienna are proceeding well, and the prospects for the Soviet-U.S. START negotiations are also good. Moscow and Washington agree on reducing their troops in Central Europe to 195,000 men. A spring of disarmament seems to be imminent.

All this is not surprising for former Pentagon chief Schlesinger. In his view, a drastic reduction of U.S. troops in

Europe is the logical consequence of the changed balance of power and the Warsaw Pact, which is no longer militarily relevant and which he can no longer see as a threat.

However, one hears that Washington sees this completely differently. According to a secret paper on strategy drawn up by Secretary of Defense Cheney, everything will remain as it is. On the contrary, the confrontation with the USSR—until 1997 for the time being—even necessitates the acceleration of the development of top modern weapons. In view of such concepts, if it were the time of mail coaches and mail boats one might have assumed that the news about the new situation and about the new thinking had not yet reached Washington. However, in our time one is forced to draw different conclusions. It is likely that the powerful arms industry guided Cheney's hand when he put this study on paper. It was never the answer to a threat from this direction, but only the threat itself.

## BULGARIA

### Army Chief Announces 1989 Military Cuts

*AU1402194290 Sofia BTA in English 1840 GMT  
14 Feb 90*

[Text] Sofia, February 14 (BTA)—As from last year Bulgaria has cut its military spending in absolute terms and as a share in the national budget. Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defence and chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, said today that the country's military spending in 1989 amounted to 1,605 million leva, or 6.37 per cent of the 1989 budget, down from 1,713 million in 1986, 1,728 million in 1987 and 1,751 million in 1988.

Addressing a military attaches' meeting held here in connection with the recent military doctrines seminar in Vienna, the general commended highly the Vienna forum and stressed its importance for building East-West confidence, for building the Common European Home and for the success of the Conventional Forces in Europe talks. For the first time since the end of World War II, the Bulgarian delegation at the seminar had established a personal contact with the chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Torumtay, and exchanged "useful thoughts" with him.

Expounding the defensive character of Bulgaria's military doctrine, the chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army emphasized that this country has no territorial designs, does not threaten anyone and under no circumstances will launch military operations against anybody. Bulgaria does not manufacture and deploy on its territory nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, Colonel General Khristo Dobrev said.

The Bulgarian People's Army numbers 107,000 men. The General Staff is now working to reorganise mechanised infantry divisions along defensive lines by increasing their defensive components. The number of tanks in such divisions is expected to be reduced to one-third, and the number of armoured carriers and combat vehicles will be cut by 10 to 30 per cent.

If the Vienna talks succeed, some mechanised infantry divisions will be transformed into brigades, the general said.

Discussing the problems of industrial conversion, he pointed out that part of the Defence Industry capacities now turn out civilian goods, and in the coming years up to 85 per cent of these facilities will be manufacturing civilian production: equipment for the food and the textile industry, man-sized farming machinery and road construction equipment.

The general answered numerous questions and said, among other things, that the military equipment subject to elimination is now being transported to sites especially provided for the purpose.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Havel Makes State Defense Council Appointments

*LD0902222490 Prague CTK in English 1805 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 9 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has recalled Ladislav Adamec, Karel Urbanek, Ignac Janak, Jaromir Zak, Francisek Pinc and Rudolf Hegenbart from the posts of members of the State Defence Council.

He named Marian Calfa chairman of the Council, Valtr Komarek deputy chairman and Vladimir Dlouhy, Petr Pithart, Milan Cic, Jiri Dienstbier, Richard Sacher and Jiri Krizan members of the Council. Miroslav Vacek continues to be its member.

### Defense Minister Interviewed on Military Issues

*LD090222390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Colonel-General Miroslav Vacek, the minister of national defense, gave a press conference this afternoon in the building of the federal government Presidium in Prague. Since we are more interested now than ever before in the Army and everything connected with it, I asked [correspondent] Vacek for more details:

[Vacek] Newsmen were told, for example, about the rehabilitations now under way in the Army, and that from 1 April, military counterintelligence, which has hitherto been directed by the Ministry of the Interior, will be transferred to the Ministry of National Defense as the military defense intelligence [vojenske obranne zpravodajstvi].

We were also told that training for the Spartakiad [mass physical training festival] has been completely abolished, and that this year something like 90,000 reservists will not be called up for exercises—this should amount to savings for our economy of about two million korunas.

The minister of national defense said that at present, only the strongest states, that is to say strongest in the economic sense, could afford any army made up solely of professionals, because this costs four to six times more. The

purchase of very expensive MiG-29 fighter aircraft is to be cut back considerably, but we will continue to buy our military hardware from the Soviet Union.

Most of our listeners are probably interested in matters related to the formulation of the new Defense Act, and the possibility of alternative military service. On this, Colonel-General Miroslav Vacek, the minister of national defense, had this to say:

[Begin Vacek recording] Who can request civilian service? This can be requested by any citizen of our republic whose religious or moral convictions—this is the actual wording—prevents him from carrying out basic military service. The facts associated with these reasons will be assessed by a commission made up of, in addition to the military, representatives of civilian organizations, institutions, national committees, and other agencies, which will assess how far the demand is warranted. [end recording]

### Hromadka in Israel, Comments on Arms Exports

*LD0902205290 Prague CTK in English 1649 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] Jerusalem, February 9 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Josef Hromadka has said during his visit to Jerusalem that Czechoslovakia transfers its military industry into civilian production, Israeli radio has said.

The radio quoted his statement that Czechoslovakia intends to halt stage by stage its exports of arms, interpreting it as halting the exports of arms into Arab states.

It also announced that Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel will probably visit Israel in April.

The Czechoslovak representative, who is on a five-day visit to Israel, was also received by Israeli Premier Yitzhaq Shamir.

### Plzen Citizens Demand Military Airport Closure

*LD1102190890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Several thousands of Plzen citizens today demanded the abolition of the military airport Plzen-Bory and the airport in Line, because airport noise is making a normal life impossible for citizens.

Questions were answered by an air unit commander, despite the fact that offensive shouting from the crowd prevented him from finishing his opening address. Only after passions had cooled down did citizens learn that a possible transfer of some air units is currently being discussed and that last year the flight height of helicopters was increased from 200 to 300 meters.

Soldiers cooperated with the demonstration's organizers and provided sound equipment for the meeting and served hot tea for children.

**Former Government Lied About Semtex Exports**

PM1202181090 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English  
10 Feb 90 p 9

[Frances Harris dispatch: "Czechs Lied to Britain Over Semtex After Lockerbie"]

[Text] Prague—The ousted Czech government lied to Britain after the Lockerbie disaster about when it halted sales of Semtex explosives, it was disclosed yesterday.

Mr Jiri Novi, Semtex factory director, said sales of the almost undetectable explosive continued until 1988—the year Pan AM Flight 103 was destroyed—despite a formal Czech assurance to Britain that exports were halted in 1982.

Following the Lockerbie bombing, a team of Czech explosives experts visited London at Britain's invitation to discuss means of chemically marking Semtex.

At that time, British officials said: "We accept the Czechoslovak government's assurance that they do not export explosives to terrorists. We understand that they no longer export Semtex, and have not done so since 1982."

But Mr Novi said sales continued to Comecon countries until the year of the Lockerbie bombing: "The last export to non-Comecon countries took place in 1981; the last export to Comecon nations in 1988."

He added that two countries took supplies in those seven years, but refused to name them.

The revelation was all the more baffling because Czechoslovakia's Communists have failed to reveal whether they supplied terrorist quatermasters such as Libya direct.

Mr Novi and his senior managers hinted that Libya got supplies from a third party. The new information means anti-terrorist squads in the West may have to revise their estimates of the quantities in terrorist hands.

For the first time, Mr Novi disclosed production figures for the plastic explosive favoured by the IRA and Arab terrorists. The Synthesia factory in the village of Semtin makes 100 tons a year.

The explosive was designed for industrial use, but its power, malleability and ability to pass airport security checks make it a terrorist favourite. Semtex has been produced at the site for over more than 20 years.

Mr Novi said morale at the 9,500-worker plant dipped after Lockerbie.

A Foreign Office spokesman confirmed yesterday that Britain had received assurances in 1989 that Czechoslovakia had ceased to export Semtex in 1982. "We have seen reports that exports continued until 1988 and we are seeking clarifications," he added.

**Poll: Majority Want Soviet Troops Out Now**

LD1202230490 Prague CTK in English 2019 GMT  
12 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 12 (CTK)—A total of 61 per cent of Czechoslovak people are of the opinion that Soviet soldiers should leave at once, 32 per cent answered that they should withdraw by the end of this year, three per cent were of the opinion that they should stay for several years and one per cent that they should not leave at all, according to a public opinion poll carried out from January 31 to February 6.

770 Czechoslovak citizens over 15 years took part in the poll.

One-fifth of respondents said that the two Germanys should unite as soon as possible. 36 per cent were for unification in the future and 29 per cent supported the division and preservation of the two German states. Dealing with the question if unified Germany could be dangerous for the security of Czechoslovakia, Europe and the whole world the respondents answered as follows: for Czechoslovakia—45 per cent said yes, 46 per cent no, 9 per cent do not know. For European security—44 per cent yes, 47 per cent no, 9 per cent do not know. For the world—29 per cent yes, 58 per cent no, 13 per cent do not know.

**Moscow Talks To Concentrate on Troop Withdrawal**

LD1402173390 Prague CTK in English 1501 GMT  
14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, February 14 (CTK)—The talks between Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and Soviet supreme representative Mikhail Gorbachev will concentrate mainly on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov told newsmen here Wednesday on Vaclav Havel's upcoming visit to Moscow due on February 26.

Gennadiy Gerasimov further said that the two sides are expected to exchange views on the further development of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations with regard to the changes in both countries.

The Soviet spokesman confirmed that in this connection Mikhail Gorbachev has sent a personal message to Vaclav Havel.

The Soviet Union hopes that the two sides will reach mutually acceptable agreements on the conditions and deadline of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, adding that this would make it possible to solve also other complicated military-technological and social problems.

**Troop Withdrawal Requires 'Mutual Understanding'**

AU1402134190 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
10 Feb 90 p 5

[Stefan Jaska commentary: "Let Us Not Add Fuel to Fire"]

[Text] The issue surrounding the Soviet troops' presence in our country and, in particular, their withdrawal is very complicated. This has arisen, it is true, through no fault of

ours. The Soviet Government, which condemned the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and apologized to us, has also officially made its views known on this subject.

Every sensible person knows that the Soviet Union has become one of the most important initiators of the disarmament process in recent years and that it has even proposed withdrawing all troops from foreign territories. In this spirit it has resolved to withdraw its units from Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no reason to organize demonstrations against Soviet soldiers at a time when negotiations on their departure are taking place. I do not know if our government sees, or does not want to see, the societal danger in the atmosphere being whipped up in connection with this.

I do not agree with a military solution to political problems, such as the entry of armies into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Similarly, however, I cannot agree with some people's suppositions that since the troops' arrival in our country took only one night they should leave in such a short time! Do we realize that thousands of soldiers and officers have their families and children here and that in their homeland they have nowhere to live? I know we cannot do anything about this. However, I am sure that the Soviet soldiers themselves and their families also cannot do anything about this and that they would be very glad to be at home with their friends.

I know that the Soviet troop presence is a costly matter and that their withdrawal would mean the vacating of apartments, of which there is a shortage in our country, and so on. But let us think about it seriously and in an unbiased manner. Let us not create a malicious atmosphere, an atmosphere of enmity between people and nations. We want to establish a new, democratic, and humane society. We have to resolve many problems and for all of this we need common sense, mutual understanding, and responsibility.

#### Foreign Minister Comments on Ottawa Talks

##### Troop Agreement of 'Great Importance'

LD1402130490 Prague CTK in English 0930 GMT  
14 Feb 90

[Text] Ottawa, February 14 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier has said that the reached agreement on U.S. and Soviet troops cuts in Europe is of great importance for Czechoslovakia as it definitively means that the question of Soviet troops withdrawal from Czechoslovakia cannot be linked with the Vienna talks.

In an interview for CTK and Czechoslovak radio at the close of the "Open Skies" conference of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers in Ottawa, Jiri Dienstbier stressed that the ceiling of foreign troops is now so low that no contingent of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia would go in its limits.

The minister voiced the opinion that the forthcoming visit of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to Canada and the USA will be a climax to the process of restoring Czechoslovakia's relations on a normal basis. Only after all

these visits and agreements, a commission of experts will have to go into session to prepare as soon as possible the necessary documents.

Asked about his bilateral talks in Ottawa, Jiri Dienstbier said that he conducted talks practically with all the present ministers. All these meetings were frank and in his opinion, all show great interest in Czechoslovakia and cooperation with the country.

The minister discussed with his counterparts the removal of visa duties, the exchange of students, stays of Czechoslovak managers and top technicians abroad, the possibilities of signing various agreements and other topics.

#### Effects on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD1402154690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1100 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] As we have already reported, the 'Open Skies' conference of foreign ministers from the Warsaw Pact and NATO has ended in Ottawa. At the end of the conference, Jozef Knizat, our correspondent in Ottawa, asked Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier for the following interview:

[Begin Knizat recording in Slovak; very poor reception] Mr. Minister, much has been said about the importance of the Ottawa conference...[end recording]

[Announcer] You can hear that the quality of telephone lines from Ottawa is very bad indeed, thus I will read you the transcript of the interview:

In reply to our correspondent's first question to assess the importance of the Ottawa deliberations and to compare them with the Vienna talks on conventions disarmament in Europe, Minister Dienstbier said:

Concerning the conventional disarmament in Europe, an agreement has just been reached that the ceiling of both Soviet and U.S. troops in Europe will be 195,000 soldiers on both sides and 30,000 U.S. soldiers in other parts of Europe. I think that this is a very important result, above all for us in Czechoslovakia since this means quite definitively that the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is not linked with the Vienna talks, because the ceiling of those foreign troops is so low that no contingent of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia will be included in its limits.

The next question concerned the reunification of Germany. Jiri Dienstbier said in this connection:

An agreement has also been reached here: A system two plus four will be set up—both German states will be holding talks and at the same time all four victorious powers will be holding talks—so that this entire process is under control, so that it is not only spontaneous but also based on cooperation and agreements.

Then Jozef Knizat asked Jiri Dienstbier to assess the number of bilateral talks with ministers from Warsaw Pact member states and from Atlantic Alliance states in Ottawa. Here is his answer:

I have talked to practically all ministers present here, with some of them for a longer time, at special meetings, with some at dinner, and in the past with some—for example with French Minister Dumas last Saturday in Paris—and I will talk to Mr. Baker in Washington next week. All those talks have been quite open and I think that all indicate the great interest in Czechoslovakia, a great interest in cooperation. I have discussed with all the ministers subjects including the gradual removal of visa duties, exchanges of students, training of our managers and top technicians, and also the signing of various agreements. Our problem is above all in the fact that we have not got as yet legislation ready for many forms of cooperation. Legal changes have not been made yet in foreign trade, for example. In fact, the monopoly of the foreign trade is still legally valid. Agreements with all on the support and protection of investments will be drafted; I could list a whole number of things because we are making a start everywhere and we do not have the relevant instruments, both in the internal legislation and in contractual relations. And I think that this will be the main task for the next months: to put all these things in order so that we can indeed start cooperating on an entirely new basis.

In the last question, our correspondent asked Minister Dienstbier whether the forthcoming visit of President Havel to the United States and Canada was discussed in his bilateral talks with Ministers Baker and Clark. The Czechoslovak foreign minister replied:

Naturally, we have also discussed this, but I believe that the president's visit here in Canada and in the United States will be a kind of a culmination, a culmination of the process of renewal of our relations on a normal basis. Only then, after all those visits and agreements, a commission of experts will be set up to prepare as soon as possible the necessary documents. We are immediately creating bilateral instruments so as not to be drowned in commissions; and we have agreed with both the British and French foreign ministers that someone in our ministries will be directly responsible for the cooperation of our bilateral relations and for the preparation of the necessary agreements.

#### **Gen Slimak Briefs Deputies on Troop Departure**

*LD1502211890 Prague Television Service  
in Czech 1830 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Summary] General Slimak today briefed deputies of the Defense and Security Committees on the departure of Soviet troops. The current delay in the departure has no military or political reasons, only social and technical ones. Sixteen thousand families of Soviet soldiers and civilian employees live in Czechoslovakia, including 13,000 schoolchildren. Seventy percent of these families have no flats available in the USSR. Moreover, in view of the capacity of railway transport, departure of Soviet troops cannot be finished by the end of the year. According

to a preliminary agreement, 30 to 50 percent of the main types of military equipment should leave Czechoslovakia by 30 May, and 35 percent of the personnel. The earliest departure should commence at the end of February, first from the area of Bruntal.

#### **Experts Meet; Troop Withdrawal To Begin 26 Feb**

*LD1502195190 Prague Domestic Service  
in Slovak 1900 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] Today a working group of Czechoslovak and Soviet experts held talks on military, technical, and organizational questions of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovak territory.

The Soviet troops will begin to withdraw from our territory beginning 26 February this year, and the first phase of the withdrawal of the substantial part of troops will be concluded by 31 May 1990.

A commission for a practical implementation of the troop withdrawal begins its work tomorrow.

The Soviet side undertook at the same time to reduce the intensity of the military training, and convoys to military exercise areas will take place only when approved by national committees.

Talks on the final text of the agreement on the troop withdrawal continue.

#### **Planning for Soviet Troop Withdrawal Continues**

##### **First Withdrawal Outlined**

*LD1602200290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1730 GMT 16 Feb 90*

[Summary] The first area from which Soviet military units are to be withdrawn is the Bruntal district. Pavel Smid, our correspondent, reports that the first round of the now official negotiations took place today in Krnov. According to Jaroslav Vrzal, chairman of the city national committee, the actual deadline for starting the withdrawal is 26 February. The withdrawal should end by 30 March. By then 197 apartments should be freed for the local population, following the necessary alterations. Barracks will also serve civilian purposes, in view of the decision of our Ministry of National Defense that there will be no military garrison in this city of 26,000. The extensive shooting range and tank training area on the outskirts of Krnov will be recultivated and handed over to farmers.

Similar talks were under way today also in Bruntal, the headquarters of a Soviet tank division. Commissions of experts and representatives of Civic Initiative are already working in this district town in order to determine by the end of March the overall extent of damage caused by troops during their stay.

In both North Moravian cities state organs are preparing measures to ensure that the departure of Soviet military units will be completed by the end of the month without any disturbing effects—for instance, without excessive buying of goods in our shops.



**Tremosna Radar Station Vacated***LD1902185390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1730 GMT 19 Feb 90*

[Text] The handing over of the compound at Tremosna near Plzen which, up to now has served the Soviet troops manning radar equipment, began today. In the course of the next few days the Soviet troops should transfer themselves and their equipment to Neratovice and from there back to the Soviet Union, depending on transport facilities. The whole compound at Tremosna consists of three low level buildings, one shed, and one unfinished housing unit with 12 one-bedroom apartments. A CTK reporter wanted to capture the Soviet troop withdrawal on film. The Soviet officers at first stipulated that he should not film military equipment. When, however, he began filming the loading of furniture and other personal belongings of the Soviet citizens, he was asked to destroy the film. In an attempt to prevent any trouble, Jiri Berger, the reporter, opened up the camera and destroyed all documentary evidence.

**Minister of Defense Holds News Conference***AU1802135390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak  
10 Feb 90 p 3*

[Alena Borovickova report: "Part of Society"]

[Text] At the start of his meeting with journalists in Prague yesterday, Colonel General Miroslav Vacek, CSSR minister for national defense, briefly evaluated the work carried out by the Czechoslovak Army during the past two months. He resolutely rejected claims that the Army is merely putting on a show or that it is only making cosmetic changes. He stressed that it is fulfilling its tasks under the unusual but, at present, expedient control of the general public. However, the people's negative attitudes toward the Army's military activity, specifically toward professional soldiers, are still palpable.

Steps have already been taken toward rehabilitating soldiers who were dismissed from the Army in 1968-69 in particular, but also in the years 1948-1989. During this period, approximately 5,800 professional soldiers left the Army. So far, approximately 700 people have shown an interest in returning to it.

The influence of airfields on the environment is one of the burning issues which the Army has to contend with at the moment. The minister for national defense stated that the complaints of citizens living in their proximity are justified. Measures were adopted in the past to ensure that the presence of military aircraft disturb the population as little as possible. For example, it is no longer a secret that our pilots fly for 70 flying hours per annum while Americans fly for 250 flying hours per annum. There is a danger, and it is understandable, that they have had much less training than their Western counterparts. It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that the value of each military airfield is, roughly, two billion korunas and that it is impossible to site them elsewhere.

The Army is willing to reach a compromise with those living in the immediate proximity of military airfields, and

wants to offer people the service of its health care facilities and to develop a network providing urgent medical assistance to citizens by making use of helicopters. It is planned to establish summer camps for children from the most vulnerable regions; it will take most of the financial burden on itself...

In reply to a question about the number and future of military exercise areas, the minister for national defense said that at present there are 14 areas amounting to 2,400 square kilometers; however, it would be a mistake to assume that this is all quality agricultural land. There are plans to hand over some of areas (after the disarmament talks in Vienna) to the general public for recreation purposes as they have not been destroyed everywhere.

As far as trade in military technology is concerned, this specifically involves purchases of MiG 29 aircraft from the USSR. Minister Vacek stressed that as long as Czechoslovakia is a member of the Warsaw Pact, it will purchase the necessary technology in the Soviet Union. But within the framework of its cutbacks, it will have to limit these purchases.

Apropos the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the minister for national defense said that at present there are on our territory 73,500 Soviet troops, 1,200 tanks, 2,500 combat vehicles and personnel carriers, and 77 fighter aircraft. There is, and there can be, no talk of their withdrawal within a few days; this should realistically take place during the course of 1990.

**Withdrawal Pact Expected During USSR Visit***LD2102100990 Prague CTK in English  
0635 GMT 21 Feb 90*

[Text] Washington, February 21 (CTK)—Czechoslovakia hopes that the discussions with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia will be successfully concluded before or during the forthcoming visit of President Vaclav Havel to the Soviet Union. Press spokesman for the president Michael Zantovskiy said at a briefing here today.

The Czechoslovak side was interested in the American evaluation of the situation in central and Eastern Europe. In this connection President Havel stressed that Czechoslovakia wants to maintain friendly and equal relations with the Soviet Union.

The Czechoslovak and American Presidents discussed in the White House numerous proposals for the expansion of cooperation, e.g. in the struggle against criminality and extradition of criminals. They also dealt with the possibility of American technical and program assistance in the foundation of new Czechoslovak television programs.

The presidents are believed to meet for another unplanned discussion today which proves the good course of their talks, Michael Zantovsky stressed.

### Vacek Urges Realistic Approach to Defense

LD2102225890 Prague CTK in English 2121 GMT  
21 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 21 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Miroslav Vacek today stressed the necessity to go along the path of state policy in questions of national defence.

Speaking at a meeting of leading functionaries of the Czechoslovak People's Army, which he presided, Miroslav Vacek said that the army must preserve functions for which it was established many decades ago. Changes must be made quickly but not hastily so that possible mistakes are avoided.

A part of the public, several political parties, movements and initiatives come with demands that are unrealistic and do not correspond with the present development in the world or with the material possibilities of the state, Miroslav Vacek said.

The participants in the meeting stressed that the consistent democratization of life in military collectives is a serious and decisive prerequisite in building up the bases of a new and modern army.

### Further Developments on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

#### Slimak Releases Withdrawal Dates

LD2202115390 Prague Domestic Service  
in Slovak 1100 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory will commence on 26 February in the military garrisons Frenstat pod Radhostem and Krnov. This was announced today at the news conference in Prague by Major General Anton Slimak, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of staff. The first stage of the withdrawal of Central Group of Soviet Forces from Czechoslovakia should end by 30 May. [Prague Domestic Service in Czech at 1130 GMT on 22 February in a similar report adds "The last Soviet soldiers from Frenstat should cross the borders on 13 March and those from Krnov on 25 March. The first stage of the withdrawal of the Central Group of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia should be completed by 30 May."]

### Soviet Diplomats Questioned

LD1602141490 Prague Domestic Service  
in Czech 1730 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] The INDEPENDENT YOUTH PRESS AGENCY organized a news conference today. Lubos Lidicky reports:

[Begin Lidicky recording] The main point of the news conference is the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, as well as other commercial, economic, and political relations. Therefore, it is no wonder that the press conference is continuing. Journalists' questions are being answered by Vasilii Filipov, political attache, and Oleg Lushnikov, economic attache, of the USSR Embassy. As

for the most interesting question, departure of Soviet troops, a group of lawyers is having talks in Moscow and a group of experts on technical problems is in session in Prague. What is involved here, above all, is the transfer of Soviet troops overloading Czechoslovak railways.

The departure should commence in the next few days, and a considerable portion of the troops should have left our territory by May. According to Mr. Filipov, there is a technical hindrance, namely that Soviet troops will be leaving Hungary at the same time. A question was asked as to how many family members of Soviet soldiers there are in Czechoslovakia at the moment—about 16,000 families—and the same number of children, who also are attending schools here. Apartments and military objects will be handed over to Czechoslovakia; nothing will be dismantled.

Another question was asked about the number of KGB members in our country: It has been reduced to six, including the driver, Mr. Lushnikov said.

The coming visit of President Vaclav Havel to Moscow also was discussed. A four-hour conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev is envisaged. Our president will be accompanied by a large group of experts, and a meeting with artists and economic experts is being planned. [end recording]

### Legality of Troop Presence Termed 'Invalid'

LD2102230690 Prague CTK in English 2117 GMT  
21 Feb 90

[Text] Prague, February 21 (CTK)—Deputy Director of the International-Legal Department of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Gabriel Brenka told CTK today that legal provisions concerning the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia have been invalid since the beginning.

He said that the Czechoslovak delegation at the talks between Czechoslovak and Soviet experts on the Soviet troops withdrawal holds, on the basis of the direction approved by the Czechoslovak Government, a clear stand that the stay of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory has no legal basis. The two sides therefore take into consideration the actual state.

As the legal provisions concerning the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia have been invalid since the beginning, an agreement on their withdrawal that would be signed in the nearest future does not mention the bilateral agreements signed in 1968 and 1969. It takes into consideration the statement of the Czechoslovak Government of December 3, 1989 and the statement of the Soviet Government of December 3, 1989, according to which the entry of the Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the violation of international law, Gabriel Banka said.

The proposed agreement on the Soviet troops withdrawal presupposes that, within two years after it comes into force, an agreement of property rights will be signed that will adjust all open questions concerning property.

**Troop Withdrawal Solution Satisfies Both Sides****Second Round of Talks Concluded***LD2202184390 Bratislava Domestic Service  
in Slovak 1730 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Text] The second round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia ended today in Prague. The commission has drawn up and initialled the final text of the intergovernmental agreement on the departure of the troops, which will be signed in the next few days in Moscow.

Officials of the Foreign Ministry noted that they can discuss the content of the agreement only after it has been signed in Moscow. In an interview, however, Deputy Foreign Minister Evzen Vacek noted laconically: Did you notice me smile when the agreement was signed? It is promising, but the final decision must be left to the highest officials.

**Withdrawal To Take 18 Months***LD2302085790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
0500 GMT 23 Feb 90*

[Text] Ivan Aboimov, head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and deputy minister of foreign affairs, said after the end of the talks that success has been achieved in finding a solution able to satisfy both sides. He said that the gradual three-stage troop withdrawal will make it possible for appropriate preparations to be made in the Soviet Union. According to Aboimov, on the whole the withdrawal will take approximately 18 months.

**Slimak on 26 Feb Pullout, Army Troop Cuts***LD2202205490 Prague CTK in English 1658 GMT  
22 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 22 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak People's Army is to be reduced by 20,000 men by the end of this year and by another 40,000 men in the following period, Czechoslovak First Deputy Defence Minister Anton Slimak told journalists here today.

He added that also 850 tanks are to be liquidated by the end of 1990. All this will give the Czechoslovak People's Army parameters corresponding to the 10th place among European armies.

Anton Slimak pointed out the current intensive work on amendments to the Czechoslovak military doctrine which is to be published after the adoption of a new Czechoslovak Constitution on which the document will be based.

He underlined the significance of the current Vienna talks and the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" which is to be the basis of the new Czechoslovak military doctrine.

Dealing in detail with problems concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovak territory, Anton Slimak confirmed that the first units will start their pullout from Northern Moravia on February 26. He pointed out the technical and social problems following for the Soviet side from the withdrawal of 18,500 career soldiers, 5,000

civilians employed in the Army, 39,000 family members, 13,000 children of Army officers and 73,500 soldiers (which is more than stationed in Poland or Hungary) to the Soviet Union. He stressed that the costs linked to the troops withdrawal will be fully covered by the Soviet side while compensation for ecological devastation of the occupied territories will be a subject of an inter-governmental agreement.

"I am convinced that most Soviet soldiers understand the necessity of their pullout. However, there are certainly also those who cannot easily put up with leaving under pressure and not of their own will," Anton Slimak said.

**USSR Troops Begin Withdrawal from Czechoslovakia****Troops, Equipment Leave N. Moravia***LD2602175790 Prague CTK in English 1605 GMT  
26 Feb 90*

[Text] Frenstat Pod Radhostem, North Moravia, February 26 (CTK)—A train fully loaded with Soviet tanks, ammunition and heavy combat equipment left here for the Soviet Union at 14:40 Central European Time today. After almost 22 years the withdrawal of Soviet troops "temporarily" deployed in Czechoslovakia has started.

Today's farewell to Soviet soldiers at the Friendstat Barracks in the presence of Czechoslovak and foreign journalists was dignified.

The almost 2,000 Soviet soldiers deployed in Frenstat will have to leave by March 15 at the latest. Another two trains of the expected 14 will leave tomorrow. Columns of cars are to leave in the last stage of the withdrawal. A total of 226 flats [apartments] and out-buildings will be handed to the national committee here.

The talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops started in Prague on January 15, 1990. The final inter-governmental agreement on the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is ready for signing. The biggest problem in its elaboration was the Soviet Union's disagreement with the Czechoslovak demand that all Soviet troops should leave Czechoslovakia by the end of this year. The Soviet Union explained its position as being due to technical problems related to the withdrawal and proposed the end of 1991 as the deadline for the pull-out. At a press conference in Prague on February 13 Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky admitted the possibility of a compromise settlement of the deadline for the pull-out.

Czechoslovakia's demand is that a decisive part of the Soviet troops, in particular the combat units, leave Czechoslovakia by the June parliamentary elections.

Soviet troops occupied Czechoslovakia together with Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian units on August 21, 1968 in order to stop the continuation of the democratization process in society. While Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops later left Czechoslovakia, the Soviet units remained here under a "Czechoslovak-Soviet Government agreement on conditions of

the temporary stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia", signed on October 16, 1968 in Prague.

In its statement of December 3, 1989 the Czechoslovak Government characterized the August 1968 invasion as a violation of norms of relations between sovereign countries and proposed to the Soviet Government to start talks on an inter-governmental agreement on the stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

During their meeting on December 4, 1989 in Moscow, the leading representatives of Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and the USSR qualified the military intervention of their troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as interference in the affairs of the sovereign Czechoslovak state, and stated that this military intervention must be condemned.

### **Government Outlines Withdrawal**

*LD2602202590 Prague CTK in English 1854 GMT  
26 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 26 (CTK)—35 per cent of Soviet soldiers and 50 per cent of the most dangerous combat technology will leave the Czechoslovak territory by the end of this May, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Evzen Vacek told the Federal Assembly here today.

The second stage of the withdrawal will be completed by December 31, 1990 and the remaining Soviet soldiers and their families will leave the country by June 30, 1991.

Deputy of the House of the People Michael Kocab stressed that he does not consider the term of the completion of the withdrawal to be ideal. He called for a quick annulment of the treaty of October 1968 and draw attention to the situation in the Soviet Union which cannot be predicted. "If conservative forces in the Soviet Union take over power, the term of the withdrawal of Soviet troops could be considerably prolonged e.g. under the pretext of a united Germany", he underlined.

Michael Kocab also suggested the creation of a mixed parliamentary commission which would monitor the withdrawal of the troops.

Commenting on the question if the withdrawal of Soviet troops and bilateral discussions do not affect the disarmament consultations of 23 countries in Vienna, Evzen Vacek said that they will be beneficial for them. In the debate the deputies appreciated the procedure of the Czechoslovak delegation during the discussions with the Soviet side and described their result as successful.

## **GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

### **Boehme Calls for 'Demilitarized' Europe**

*LD0902063590 East Berlin ADN International  
Service in German 1712 GMT 9 Feb 90*

[Text] West Berlin (ADN)—In Berlin today at the Congress of the Federation of Social Democratic Parties of the EC, Ibrahim Boehme, manager [geschaefsfuehrer] of the SPD [Social Democratic Party] in the GDR, called for a

demilitarized, democratic, European home that would exclude none of the continent's peoples.

The process of the unification of the German people up to the Oder/Niesse is embedded in this process. Here it is a matter of steps, which make it seem meaningful to the people in the GDR to remain in their country with full readiness to work to the best of their ability. The next thing is to arrange a monetary and economic union with the FRG.

The Social Democrats in the GDR are not giving priority to German neutrality because this would irritate the contiguous states, Boehme said. The SPD is more in favor of step-by-step disarmament in the two German states within the framework of a worldwide disarmament process.

### **Modrow Says Retaining Army 'Essential'**

*LD1102133790 East Berlin ADN International  
Service in German 1237 GMT 11 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The National People's Army (NVA) of the GDR is and remains for him an essential element in the parallel processes of stabilizing society in the country and bringing together of the two German states, in the revolutionary changes in all the Warsaw Pact member states, in building the European home, and in radical disarmament. This view is expressed by GDR Premier Dr. Hans Modrow in an interview with the VOLKSARMEE magazine, prereleased to ADN on Sunday.

It was and remains the NVA's task "to guarantee the external security of the GDR and her citizens against all military dangers." It must make growing contributions, both in import and extent, "to military confidence building, arms control and disarmament, and thus to reducing the military balance to a steadily lower level, right down to the eventual removal of all aggressive capability, the disbandment of military pacts, and consolidation of the security partnership."

Asked about the NVA's place in his concept for "Germany, united fatherland," Modrow said that "whatever the pros and cons" one must proceed from the premise "that one day there will exist a united German state on the basis of several federal states," for even the majority of GDR citizens are, according to latest opinion polls, in favor of unification of the two German states and West Berlin. "But we would misinterpret our interests if we are indifferent to the interests of neighboring states, the allies, and other European states." Therefore, at no stage should the situation be allowed to destabilize, and in parallel with everything being done in Central Europe, a conscious contribution should be made to new cooperative security structures on the continent.

Modrow said he has come to the conclusion "that military neutralization of a future greater Germany could be an acceptable solution." Protest against that was raised at the recent international defense forum in Munich.

On the role and place of the NVA, the GDR head of government affirmed "first, the need of its continuing existence." The GDR Armed Forces, through the alliance

partnership in the Warsaw Pact, are part of the present European security setup and represent a factor of political and military stability in it.

The GDR Military Reform Commission, together with competent roundtable representatives, is presently engaged in changing the structure and equipment of the NVA to reduce its size and revamp its training, and to base this on the absolute minimum to meet its obligations under the Constitution. In this we cannot abandon our international obligations, our responsibility for European security, Modrow stressed.

The principles of GDR military doctrine are at present being discussed especially by the People's Chamber and the roundtable, in order to adopt relevant resolutions. The GDR premier referred in this connection to the significant unilateral reductions in the NVA that started last year.

A consensus has been achieved with the forces bearing political responsibility "that the process of gradual unification of the German states should go hand in hand with a gradual reduction of the NVA and, we also believe, of the Bundeswehr." Modrow also advocated further steps in accordance with the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and the continuing general process of international detente. "But let us not forget that new pan-European security structures still must be created."

He sees no contradiction between his concept and the summons published earlier this month calling up for military service those born in 1972. "All responsible politicians are aware that the future development in our country and the process of unification of the two German states and the future of disarmament and demilitarization in Europe cannot be carried out in haste." Until then military service will inevitably exist, Modrow said, and recalled the alternative of doing civilian service instead. "However, the duty of every male youngster to serve a certain time for the benefit of society and its security will presumably remain, as in the FRG today."

### **Modrow Rejects Stoltenberg NATO Plan**

*AU1902132690 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 19 Feb 90*

[Text] GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow has rejected considerations on expanding NATO's sphere of influence to the territory of the present GDR in the event of unification of the two German states. Modrow said in East Berlin on 19 February that demands to expand the Western alliance to the Oder-Neisse border or to link the process of unification with the inclusion of NATO are not apt to create confidence in Europe. He was reacting to statements made by Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, who said on 16 February that after unification the protection guaranteed by the NATO Treaty applied to the whole territory of Germany and thus, not only to the FRG.

Stoltenberg's concept was also criticized by the Free Democratic Party [FDP] and the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]. FDP Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff called upon Federal Chancellor Kohl to clarify the quarrel

within the coalition. At the same time, he backed Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's position that in the event of a unified Germany, no Western troops must be deployed on the territory of the present GDR.

SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel accused Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg of having stabbed Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the back with his proposal. He said that he did not understand at all why Stoltenberg provoked the Soviet Union at this time in such a way.

The German Bundeswehr Association has also backed Genscher's position. The chairman of this association, (Wenzel), said in an interview with Saarbruecken Saarlaendischer Rundfunk Network that after unification, the deployment of Bundeswehr troops must be confined to the territory of the present FRG.

### **Eppelmann Defends 'Necessity' of Army**

*LD1902145190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1338 GMT 19 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The existence of the National People's Army (NVA) on the territory of the present GDR is an essential necessity even after the People's Chamber elections on 18 March, Minister Rainer Eppelmann (Democratic Awakening) said today during a visit to the GDR Defense Ministry. In a conversation with Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, Eppelmann was acquainted with the military reform in the GDR, the situation in the NVA, and the concepts and perspectives of the NVA's development, bearing in mind the unification of the two German states.

Minister Eppelmann met with officers and cadet sergeants of the NVA and was briefed on their views of the political restructuring and the social concerns of Army members.

According to a statement by the Defense Ministry, the two ministers expressed the view that immediately after the elections a joint military commission should be set up between the NVA and the Bundeswehr to deal with those issues arising out of the growing together of the two German states for their armies and European security.

Ministers Eppelmann and Hoffmann, it said, intend to submit to the government a joint proposal to lift the Council of Ministers resolution of 1978 concerning the awarding of traditional names. Accordingly, formations, troop sections, units, and establishments of the NVA and border troops are no longer to bear those names that are contrary to the perception and the pluralistic view of tradition and German traditions.

### **Nonalignment of Future Germany Advocated**

*AU2002125490 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 16 Feb 90 p 2*

[Reiner Oschmann editorial: "Frightening—for Whom?"]

[Text] The more—responsible or irresponsible—talk there is about the conditions, the date, and the form of German unity, the more urgent becomes the question concerning the membership in an alliance of the 80 million people.

The debate is becoming increasingly heated. However, the warning that has been constantly repeated in the West since Modrow presented his ideas on the neutrality of a future Germany is both striking and incomprehensible for ordinary citizens: Germany may be everything but neutral! It should be united and be a member of NATO.

Figures like Manfred Woerner, but also other important politicians—most recently the British foreign secretary—state categorically that countries like Switzerland and Austria may be neutral but not Germany. Nonalignment is incompatible with security, reliability, and peacefulness, they argue. Is that true?

My impression is that the fear of neutrality seems to affect primarily those in the West who see neutrality as a preliminary stage of a synonym of demilitarization. However, what should be so frightening about a Germany that would ultimately be free from armies and weapons? If the word "German" occasionally sounded too metallic for people in the past, this was not because of unspecific German vices but because the German economic superpower developed into a German military power, which led to the well-known results.

However, why should a demilitarized Germany, one which would hopefully be the germ cell of a really collective and large-scale European security system, be "more dangerous" and "more unreliable" than the continued existence of a NATO that continues the arms race?

It is true that the reduction of the enormous weapons arsenals will be difficult concerning the details. However, the risks of the reduction must not be used as an alibi for increasingly absurd arguments in favor of the continued arms race. Common sense seems to prevail in the East and West in this connection. A total of 92 percent of all GDR citizens and 58 percent of all FRG citizens interviewed in a representative opinion poll by the Wickert Institutes were in favor of a nonalignment of Germany after its reunification. This alone demonstrates the worldwide desire for a Germany without weapons and a world without military blocs.

It seems as if the times would become more difficult for swords and easier for plowshares. The news from Ottawa that the Soviet Union and the United States want to reduce their troops in Central Europe to 195,000 men each is to be welcomed in this connection. Does this represent a renewal of the principle of hope?

#### **Defense Minister Wants Troops To Stay**

*LD2402093290 East Berlin ADN International  
Service in German 0316 GMT 24 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—In an interview with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, GDR Defense Minister Theodor Hoffmann has today spoken in favor of the presence of Soviet and U.S. troops in a Germany that is growing together. Apart from this, the two German states should remain members of their alliances while they grow together politically and economically.

"The military disengagement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe will occur step by step within the framework of pan-European disarmament agreements," he said, explaining the Defense Ministry's conceptual positions on the future of the Armed Forces. "If the two German states and their armed forces fulfill their political obligations within the alliances, they will also remain politically calculable during the formation of federative institutions for Europe. The continued presence of contingents of Soviet and U.S. troops on the territories of the two German states, even if they are only of a symbolic nature at a certain time, will lead to a favorable framework for stability and security during this period," the minister said.

"We are striving for solutions that can be slotted into future European security structures at any given time. The military issue must be the bridge to this."

In his opinion, a federal German state could have a federal army composed of citizens from all parts of the country and a total strength of no more than around 300,000 men during peacetime. Fewer would make training impossible and more would cause concern among neighboring countries.

The minister said the process of German unification has "few historical prospects if it is not bound to European security structures and guarantees that no danger to peace will come from a united German state." It appears at the moment that the process of German unification might proceed faster than the European one.

#### **Timetable Outlined for USSR Troop Withdrawal**

*LD2402171290 Prague CTK in English 1627 GMT  
24 Feb 90*

[Text] Prague, February 24 (CTK)—The first stage of Soviet troops' departure from Czechoslovakia will end on May 31, 1990, the second at the end of this year, and the last Soviet soldiers will leave the country in 1991, but no specific date has been fixed as yet.

This was said by commander of the Central Group of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia Lieutenant General Eduard Vorobyov at a press conference at Milovice, central Bohemia.

A total of 73,500 troops, 1,220 tanks, 2,505 combat vehicles, 1,218 artillery weapons of an over (?100) mm calibre, 77 warplanes, 146 helicopters, and other armament and material stocks will be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Eduard Vorobyov said. He added that 600 families of Soviet soldiers have already returned to the Soviet Union.

In the first stage, the premises of twelve garrisons and 4,000 flats will be freed, the Soviet commander said, pointing out that since February 16, joint Czechoslovak-Soviet commissions have been working in all units of the Soviet army controlling the condition of the structures and fixing the damage caused.

It is said that the Soviet side has spent 237.9 million roubles on the building of new structures since 1968, and the Czechoslovak side 255 million roubles.

### Roundtable on GDR Military Reform

#### Army of Only 70,000

*LD2602185190 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1700 GMT 26 Feb 90*

[Excerpt] According to Defense Minister Theodor Hoffmann, the GDR Defense Ministry is planning to turn the National People's Army [NVA] into a defense-oriented professional army with only 70,000 soldiers by the end of 1993. Speaking to the roundtable in East Berlin, Hoffmann stressed today that the precondition for this, however, is further progress in the European disarmament negotiations. With the creation of a volunteer army, any military service for GDR citizens in peacetime would be dropped. The NVA currently has about 173,000 soldiers. [passage omitted]

#### Military Reform Adopted

*LD2602201590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1903 GMT 26 Feb 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The highest principle of military policy in the GDR has to be "to do everything to preserve peace in Europe, to promote cooperation with all states, to overcome the system of military deterrence, and to achieve security in Europe together." This is noted in a roundtable 10-point position paper on military reform in the GDR, which was unanimously adopted on Monday evening [26 February] after intensive discussion.

The GDR favors the dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military blocs. As long as these continue to exist, the GDR will work with its partners in the Warsaw Pact, says the paper, which is to be passed on to the government. In it, military reform is said to be a part of the democratic changes in the GDR.

The roundtable rejects the statement contained in Paragraph 17 of the draft military service law, which says that soldiers are not allowed "to be members of political parties and organizations. Membership entered into prior to military service will be suspended for the period of service." Such a rule contravenes the principles of the current Constitution and the roundtable's concept of democracy.

Within the framework of the Armed Forces members' political education, representatives of all democratic parties and movements should have the opportunity to brief soldiers who so wish about their political aims. However, activity by the parties and political groupings in the Army is rejected. Support is given to activity by trade unions of soldiers and the civilian members of the National People's Army, of the Union of Professional Soldiers, and to other forms of democratic self-organization.

The paper says that by May 1990, the basic outlines of proposed disarmament should be presented to the People's Chamber. The roundtable adds that in the future the National Defense Ministry should be led by a civilian

minister. The military reforms should contain ideas about the future "that are compatible with the process of European and German unification, as well as with its effects on the dissolution of the military pacts." Within the GDR Government, an Office for Disarmament and Conversion should be formed with the aim of preparing and initiating disarmament measures up to and including full demilitarization. The roundtable rejected any form of a federal army.

## HUNGARY

### Defense Spokesman Denies MiG-29 Offer to Iraq

*LD1402140990 Budapest MTI in English 1224 GMT 14 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 14 (MTI-ECONews)—"The Hungarian Army hasn't got any MIG-29 jet fighters, so it isn't in a position to offer such aircraft for sale", Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, said in response to an ECONews inquiry.

The colonel was denying reports carried by the Tokyo paper SANKEI SHIMBUN that Hungary had allegedly offered Iraq MIG-29s at 14 million dollars a piece.

Last year, the Soviet Union put the MIG-29 through its paces at several international air shows, and since the planes are on sale in the Soviet Union, any potential customer need have looked no further than there.

Mr Ferenc Markovics, head of the Defence Office of the Council of Ministers who also heads the inter-ministry committee in charge of arms exports, confirmed on ECONews inquiry that he had no knowledge of Hungary seeking buyers for fighter planes.

According to military observers, Hungary's MIG-21 and MIG-23 interceptors can in no way be regarded as the latest models, also, even if the Army were to decide to sell them—which seems rather unlikely, even in view of the planned troop cuts announced last year—they have been used too much to draw any reasonable bids.

The information SANKEI SHIMBUN carried seems all the less probable as it mentions precisely Iraq as a buyer: The Hungarian Government made a decision only last week to ban the sale of weapons to crisis regions and countries at war.

### MDF Meets USSR Embassy Officials on Troops

*LD1502135190 Budapest MTI in English 1057 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 15 (MTI)—Denes Csegey, board member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF/MDF], has held talks at the Soviet Embassy in Budapest with Envoy-Counsellor Vladlen Puntus, Counsellor Igor Savolsky and First Secretary Vyacheslav Nemcev about issues relating to the spring manoeuvres of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

In a statement released on February 6, the National Board of the Hungarian Democratic Forum expressed concern over the spring military exercises of Soviet troops and

demanding manoeuvres be suspended so that the elections could go ahead amidst a calm atmosphere.

Speaking to MTI's correspondent about his talks at the Soviet Embassy, Denes Csengey said he had made it clear that the HDF's protest against the Soviet exercises was not intended to incite unjustified fear in Hungarians nor to be an "election bombshell." On the other hand, the HDF does not find it reassuring when the commandship of the Southern Soviet Army Group says it plans no military manoeuvres, while shooting, tank, air and other exercises are going ahead according to schedule.

In response to Csengey's proposal to suspend shooting, tank and firing exercises until the elections, the Soviet diplomats pointed out there would be no firing exercises whatsoever, driving tests on public roads had been discontinued, and further steps were planned to check shooting exercises. They said troops were to be concentrated in future exclusively in preparation for the pullout, and staff officers of the Southern Soviet Army Group had been sent to the units to ensure order.

With regard to the "open door" events to be held at Soviet garrisons in Esztergom, Veszprem and other towns over the weekend, Denes Csengey proposed issuing a dispatch to either the commander of the Southern Soviet Army Group or the unit commanders about the desired conduct during the election campaign. The Soviet side did not reject the idea.

A top Southern Soviet Army Group officer is also expected to face the press this weekend.

Asked whether the HDF was satisfied with what they had learnt from the Soviet Embassy, Denes Csengey said that although the briefing was carried out and the Forum's proposals considered in a proper fashion, the HDF would not rest completely assured as long as its rural organizations register Soviet troops movements and shooting exercises. Csengey said he would be trying to find time to go to the weekend open days. [as received]

#### **Foreign Ministry on USSR Troop Withdrawal**

*LD1502102490 Budapest MTI in English 0858 GMT  
15 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 15 (MTI)—"The accord on the Soviet troops withdrawal may be concluded in a month, considering that Budapest and Moscow share the view that the stationing of units here is unjustified from both the military and political aspects," says Ferenc Somogyi, under-secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his contribution to Thursday's "MAGYAR NEMZET".

Ferenc Somogyi recently headed the Hungarian delegation to the expert talks with the Soviet Union on the pullout of armed forces.

"We expect the agreement will be ready in a month. It is a highly intricate task to fix the schedule of withdrawals in consideration of the transport facilities and technical conditions," Ferenc Somogyi points out and adds that it is misleading to say that if in 1956 it took them two days to

come in, they could leave now at a similar speed, because that time they were already here in large numbers.

"Now the main question is how to carry out the withdrawal in a settled manner. This is expected by the international public and this is also in our interests from the point of view of the future development of Soviet-Hungarian relations," Ferenc Somogyi says in a contribution to "MAGYAR NEMZET".

#### **Soviet Air Force To Leave Debrecen in May**

*LD1502232490 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] The population of Debrecen has been protesting against the operation of the Soviet military airfield for a long time. The National Assembly allowed until 31 December [1990] for its closure. Erika Farkas reports on the latest news from Debrecen:

[Farkas] The Soviet Air Force unit is to leave Debrecen in May. One of the department heads of the southern Army group said this to the town council today.

The withdrawal has already started. The Soviet Army has given back its real estate in Gyoengyoesi Street to the Hungarian People's Army, which in the near future will probably be bought back by the council, since it was they who sold it at the time.

The living quarters on Szabadsag street will also be emptied and given back. As I have already mentioned, heavy machinery was banned from the airport as of May, and the establishment will also become the property of the Hungarian People's Army, but talks are already underway for its utilization for civilian purposes at a later date.

The final date of the evacuation is still uncertain, for the Soviet soldiers stationed here have neither jobs nor homes in the Soviet Union for the time being, thus they will move in together and await their return home in small numbers.

But even so, by May, 63 flats will be liberated which will be disposed of by the local council.

#### **Thurmer: Troop Withdrawal Timetable in 'Pipeline'**

*LD1602000390 Warsaw PAP in English 2115 GMT  
15 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 15 (MTI)—The Soviet military unit stationed in the village of Hajmasker, Veszprem County, is to pull out from the place by the end of the year, Gyula Thurmer was told by Brigadier General Iosip Organan, training deputy of the commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary.

The HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] president, who is a party candidate in the 7th constituency of Veszprem County, held talks with the commanders of the unit on the local community's worries over the presence of Soviet troops in the region, as well as questions also relating to the elections.



The brigadier general added he only said his personal opinion. But as negotiations are all pointing in this direction, a detailed timetable is already in the pipeline.

### **Pact Membership, Soviet Troop Withdrawal Viewed**

*LD1602122890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 15 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Regarding the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary, this can be concluded within a month. [passage omitted] Laszlo Lang, deputy director of the Foreign Institute, was interviewed by Jozsef Laszlo:

[Begin recording] [Laszlo] What does the Soviet troop withdrawal facilitate, Hungarian neutrality or Hungary's existence outside the blocs?

[Lang] Even if our formal ties to the Warsaw Pact still exist, our form of existence, our political form of existence, suggests a kind of existence outside the blocs.

The Soviet troop withdrawal will not change our membership in the Warsaw Pact unless we want to change our membership in the Pact, for the two have nothing to do with each other. This is a two-sided affair, that is, the presence of the Soviet troops, just the same as their withdrawal, while the Warsaw Pact is an issue of several sides, a structure with two different kinds of contracts.

However, it is obvious that the Soviet troop withdrawal—and moreover, something that is equally topical, in my opinion: the revision and renegotiation of our relations of bilateral contracts not to mention the revision of the agreements on mutual friendship, assistance, and cooperation—also will facilitate the progress of our distancing ourselves from the Warsaw Pact before long. [end recording]

### **People's Army Selling Decommissioned Tanks**

*LD1602214190 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 16 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] The [Hungarian] People's Army has made it known that owing to the troop reductions, it wishes to free itself of some tanks and aircraft which could be used for peaceful objectives, for example in agricultural production. Our reporters went out to look around and find out what was available, and they learned that apart from MiG-21's, T-52, T-54, and T-55 tanks are being sold.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] For how much are you selling the T-55?

[Unidentified speaker] We are selling the T-55 for between 50,000 and 65,000 [U.S.] dollars.

[Reporter] So a Hungarian could buy it for approximately six million forints?

[Speaker] Yes, yes.

[Reporter] Is this not a bit too much for a 25-year-old vehicle especially since on a dirt road it consumes some 300 liters of gasoline every 100 kilometers?

[Speaker] Without doubt it consumes a lot, but it can be put to very good use in forest-farming for removing tree-trunks because it has enormous strength, and with shovels these can be shifted. It's easier for landscaping, and this uses up less energy. Therefore, the outlay to pay for the 300-200 liters of fuel, which you have mentioned, is recouped.

[Reporter] Private persons can buy them, isn't that so?

[Speaker] To my knowledge there is no obstacle to this.

[Reporter] The top is taken off, and it can no longer be used in a battle condition.

[Speaker] It is not necessary to take off the top, for in that case it would be so ugly, it would not be tank-like. [Words indistinct] It could also be sold in a customized condition—inasmuch as a rich customer wants so and so and pays for the service.

[Reporter] Is it possible to bargain?

[Speaker] Naturally, like in every business, it is possible to bargain here, too.

[Reporter] When the prospective customer says he would like to buy a tank, can he choose or do you make a recommendation to him?

[Speaker] He can choose, too. [end recording]

### **Officials Discuss Future of Arms Industry**

*LD1702234390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 17 Feb 90*

[Text] Within the net of various interests, the arms trade was always a bit of a secret business. According to our present knowledge, the best year for our country was 1988, when we sold various products, mainly so-called military background products, to the tune of some 20 billion forints, that is, not only guns and cannons but various training aids and appliances.

However, the otherwise desirable peace and detente brings hard times for this trade. This year, hardly 40 percent of the 1988 turnover will be achieved and by the next year, only about one-sixth of that. So what is going to be the fate of the 17 large factories that are geared to the war industry, and what is to become of the traders, Tamas Frey, having thoroughly prepared himself on the subject, asked Antal Hej, head of the department in the Industry Ministry, and Laszlo Kocsis, chief of the main group of the Trade Ministry.

[Begin recording] [Frey] Do you consider it conceivable to counterbalance this recession by a method suggested by Western newspapers, i.e. that the possibility is there for Hungary to become a service agent for those countries that were, so to speak, covered with weapons by the Soviet Union, by these I mean the Arab countries and the African countries. Thus Hungary would not engage in arms production any more, but would see to the repair of these weapons.

[Hej or Kocsis] Naturally, we have to examine the possibilities as to what sort of opportunities we can find for fulfilling our capacity.

[Frey] From what I understand, a large part of Hungarian arms exports, about two-thirds of it, is directed to the socialist countries and this, after all, is a clean case because we give arms for arms. However, there is the remaining one-third, some 30 percent, which is sold for dollars. My question is where and to whom this is sold. [long silence follows] Is there no answer? Well, then I'll put the question another way. I refer to Western papers again that say, and I think this was not a secret anyway, that, for example, Hungary has made considerable arms deals in Third World countries. Was that so or not?

[Hej or Kocsis] I did not read these Western papers; I do not know, but everybody has to recognize one thing, that any business, not only businesses involving military technology and arms, represents certain kinds of business secrets among the traders every time.

[Frey] But I feel that I am not enquiring into a business secret because the Soviet weapons can be seen in Arab countries; it is common knowledge in a way, this can not be denied, and everybody knows that 30 percent of Hungary's military technology production eventually is sold somewhere for hard currency.

[Hej or Kocsis] Naturally. Hungary, precisely by taking the state interests into consideration, and in order to utilize the full production capacity, sold these surplus items that are not needed within the allied countries, on other markets, and she will try to do this in the future, too, as long as there is the possibility, production, and requirement for this in Hungary.

[Frey] But you do now wish to name these other markets, as to whether they are Arab or African countries for example.

[Hej or Kocsis] Well, they are about the ones, or course, many other places in the world, where ever it is possible.

[Frey] What is the principle here, that business is business, or are there other guidelines?

[Hej or Kocsis] No, no, no. Business and the possibilities of business are determined in all events by the interests of the Hungarian Republic.

[Frey] And what are these interests?

[Hej or Kocsis] Well, since we are talking about military technology and arms, it must not happen that a short-term business profit should cause political or economic damage to the country at a later date.

[Frey] But, let us stay in such general terms. Wouldn't you want to go into this question more concretely?

[Hej or Kocsis] If I did not formulate it entirely clearly, in a more concrete manner, for example, if weapons would be sold by us or by somebody else somewhere for a certain amount...

[Frey interrupting] This is not very concrete that somebody, somewhere sells something. Let us create a fictional example: Can Hungary sell a radio locator to China that China wants to use to observe the Soviet Union?

[Hej or Kocsis] Well, this would be difficult for several reasons. Firstly, we do not manufacture locators and, second, because China does not want to buy locators from us.

[Frey] Why has the structure of our arms exports changed? Twenty years ago, we sold Kalashnikovs and cannons because we manufactured them. However, today, we almost exclusively sell appliances, training implements, that is things that cannot be used for shooting. What is the reason for this? Is this a safer, better business?

[Hej or Kocsis] I think that this is the result of a perfectly natural technical development.

[Frey] So isn't this switch influenced by the fact, which one might suspect, that we manufactured these weapons, for example, the Kalashnikov, under Soviet license, and even now, we manufacture handguns under Soviet license, and the sale of these products is somewhat more difficult because permission has to be obtained from the Soviet Union. It is much more simple if we only sell exclusively Hungarian products. There is no trouble with those; we can do with them what we like.

[Hej or Kocsis] Manufacturing products of military technology is goods production. Our country, Hungarian industry and our factories must endeavor to produce goods in the most effective way. This is why this change of structure occurred in the arms industry because, due to the potentials of Hungarian industry, more effective industrial products could be manufactured in these areas than on other arms fields.

[Frey] Finally, let me thank you for your interviews and let me ask you, after all you are here on behalf of the Ministries of Industry and Trade, are you soldiers, have you any military rank?

[Hej or Kocsis] Well, the case is, so to speak...well, if you please, the situation is that we are soldiers. We are soldiers because in order to manufacture and sell military products, certain military know-how is necessary. [end recording]

### **Horn on Soviet Troop Withdrawal**

*LD1802133490 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 0730 GMT 18 Feb 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Let us continue with the German question. The scene is the Canadian capitol, or more precisely, Budapest, where Foreign Minister Gyula Horn has just returned. He replied to questions by our colleague, Jozsef P. Szabo:

[Begin recording] [Szabo] The German question was one of the central topics, even, perhaps, the most important topic at the Ottawa Open Skies summit. I sensed from Ottawa statements that Gyula Horn, perhaps, figures on a somewhat slower process regarding the question of reunification than is generally acknowledged nowadays.

[Horn] I would say that it was one of the topics of the talks. What is important in connection with the German question, at least on the basis of the talks there?

First, how fast should this process be? Regarding the pace, I think that a lot can happen within a few months in the interest of reunification, especially in the period following 18 March, that is, after the GDR elections, since preparation for the reunification have already begun in the economic, political, and many other fields.

I consider it a new development and a development of great importance, by all means, and not only from the point of view of reunification, but also from the point of view of the West Berlin question, too, that the representatives and leaders of the four superpowers and of the governments of the GDR and FRG sit down together and continuously reconcile the worries and problems in connection with reunification.

The third element is that the agreement on this contains a kind of formulation saying that they take into consideration the security interests of the neighboring countries, too.

[Szabo] Do you consider the French or Polish worries justified?

[Horn] In my opinion, it is Hungary that is the least prejudiced in connection with the German question. At the same time, the Slav states' reservations, based specifically on their very tragic past experiences, are naturally far greater than those of everyone else. Besides the Slavs, the French also have ample negative experiences. Thus, they are cautious, but the latest statement by President Mitterrand essentially expresses that France's leadership does not have reservations vis-a-vis the reunification.

[Szabo] In connection with the Central European troops reductions by the Soviet Union and the United States, an important announcement was made in Ottawa. Did this announcement, which was a surprise to us, come as a surprise to the Hungarian foreign minister?

[Horn] No, it did not come as a surprise because Shevardnadze asked us to sit down and coordinate the question on which they are going to agree with the United States, so we sat down together and he showed me the plan and the text on which they have finally agreed with the United States.

The substance of this is that the Soviet leadership accepts the [words indistinct] of 190,000. Well, what does this mean in practical terms? According to our knowledge, a Soviet contingent of 360,000 is staying in the GDR, 75,000 in Czechoslovakia, 50,000-52,000 in Hungary, and some 35,800-40,000 in Poland. Thus, this is near enough to 400,000! So if they reduce this number to 195,000, this means that practically in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, also from the point of view of the agreement, the Soviet troops' presence can be ended forthwith. So this strengthens our positions, our positions in the talks, by all means.

As to what will be the fate of the Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, I cannot tell you because this probably will be put on the table only in connection with the elections and reunification.

To our knowledge, Poland did not ask, did not require the Soviet troops' withdrawal.

[Szabo] Can the expectations be justified, that in connection with the present Soviet-American agreement, the realization of the troop withdrawal from Hungary is actually a technical question regarding its schedule, etc?

[Horn] This ascertainment is entirely justified because we have achieved our agreement in principle. Also I agreed with Shevardnadze in Ottawa that shortly, possibly in the first half of next month sometime, we will sign the inter-governmental agreement on the troop withdrawal.

There are two problems of a technical nature which, unfortunately, are more than just technical problems, that is, we are talking about an enormous amount of equipment, heavy equipment at that: tanks, armored vehicles, and so on. Scheduling and a precise agenda are necessary because we would like, and the Soviet party agrees with this, for the troop withdrawal to be carried out primarily by air and rail because if these great tanks will start rolling down our roads, they will destroy roads that are not in the best state as they are, or they would cause very serious traffic jams.

At the same time, the rather low level capacity and transfer capacity of not so much the Zahony, but the Cop Soviet railway crossing centrum also causes concern. On top of this, the Soviet units withdrawing from Czechoslovakia also go through Cop, which also creates a problem. [end recording]

### **General Denies Rumors on Selling Jet Fighters**

*AU1902145090 Budapest MTI in English  
1505 GMT 16 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, 16 February (MTI)—The Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN reported that Hungary was about to sell MiG 29 jet fighters to Iraq for 14 million dollars a piece.

Brigadier General Karoly Janza, head of one of the ministry of defence departments, has denied the news, saying that the Hungarian Army does not possess any MiG 29s.

At the same time, the brigadier general added Hungary did want to sell war technology devices which had become superfluous because of the troops and arms reductions.

These weapons, however, will be dismantled from the planes to serve exclusive peaceful purposes. [sentence as received]

For instance, disarmed T-34, T-54 and T-55 tanks are to be sold as agricultural power machines, and MiG 21 and MiG 23 planes, as well as KA-26 and MI-8 helicopters, as transport vehicles.

### **USSR's Burlakov on Soviet Troop Withdrawal**

*LD2202184890 Budapest MTI in English  
1812 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Text] Budapest, February 22 (MTI)—The Hungarian-Soviet inter-governmental agreement on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary is likely to be signed in a few weeks.

Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the southern army group and government commissioner in charge of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the Republic of Hungary, has given an interview to MTI on the subject.

Burlakov said that the decision on the troop withdrawal was no surprise to the Soviet military leadership, because the Moscow administration has dealt with the reduction of foreign-based military forces since 1985 as part of the novel way of political thinking.

A major step along this line was the decision taken by the Soviet Government in 1988 on a significant, unilateral reduction of Soviet Armed Forces. Accordingly, last year 22 units were removed from Hungary, including the 13th tank division, more than 10,000 soldiers and substantial amounts of technical devices and weapons.

The Hungarian-Soviet talks about the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops is expected to cover a wide range of issues, such as the stages and dates of the pullout, as well as solutions to property and legal problems.

The draft of the relevant accord has been completed, and the detailed schedule of troop withdrawals and the transportation of material-technical devices is shortly to be drawn up.

The units constituting the basis of the combative force of the southern army group, namely a tank division, missile units, airborne units and other troops, would be removed in the first stage, and the remainder of the troops and the material and technical devices in the second. At the request of the Debrecen municipal council, however, a concrete deadline—end of May—has already been set for withdrawing the Soviet airborne unit stationed at the airport near the town.

The commander stressed that the preparation of pullout was a particularly complicated task. The southern army group has not only 50,000 troops but also hundreds of thousands of tonnes of military equipment, including hundreds of tanks, troop carriers, technical devices and arms.

Mr Burlakov denied that the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary imposed high costs on the Hungarian Government. He said this view might have emerged because of inadequate information. The costs of maintaining the southern army group are covered by the Soviet state, Mr Burlakov said. The southern army group maintains close business contacts with a number of Hungarian firms and covers its purchases from the funds granted by the Soviet ministry of defence or pays under foreign trade deals. In some cases, accounting is even unfavourable for the Soviet

side. For instance, the electric energy imported from the Soviet Union is available at the Hungarian prices which are much higher than the Soviet ones.

Colonel General Burlakov reconfirmed that during the run-up to the Hungarian parliamentary elections the Soviet troops would not hold manoeuvres and the soldiers would not leave their barracks. The manoeuvres of the units had been postponed and the exercises of the columns of military vehicles suspended, he said.

### **Hungary's Defense Capability, Disarmament Stance Discussed**

#### **Somogyi on Chemical Weapons, Defense**

*LD2202133790 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1300 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Text] Foreign Affairs State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi stressed at the Geneva disarmament conference that Hungary is now ready to observe the provision of the chemical weapons agreement that is in the process of being worked out. He will also assent to reciprocal control of Hungarian military, industrial, and economic activity noted in the agreement. Somogyi also pointed out that the defense capability of Hungary or of the Warsaw Pact will not weaken as a result of the reform of the armed forces and the Soviet troop withdrawal. These steps, he said, will precisely contribute to creating stability in the new international situation.

#### **Further on Disarmament**

*LD2202165290 Budapest MTI in English  
1530 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Text] Geneva, February 22 (MTI)—Speaking at the Geneva disarmament conference on Thursday, Ferenc Somogyi, under-secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed that the improvement in relations between the great powers and in European conditions were most manifest in the process of the Vienna talks on conventional arms and troops reduction in Europe.

With their unprecedented pace and intensity, the negotiations clearly prove that genuine political intentions and commitment are certain to yield results.

The Hungarian Armed Forces are also undergoing comprehensive changes so as to be better adjusted to the defence requirements and economic potential of the Republic of Hungary.

Somogyi pointed out that the army reform and Soviet troop withdrawal would in no way weaken the defence capabilities of Hungary and the Warsaw Treaty, but would rather contribute to creating stability in accordance with the new international situation.

The Hungarian delegates provided comprehensive information about these questions at the Vienna forums, including the recent military doctrine seminar.

The military data revealed at that seminar in the spirit of military openness were now supplemented by Somogyi

with comprehensive information on the Hungarian Army, which he said he would present to the conference in form of a working document.

This document includes the financial sources available to the Ministry of Defense in 1990, in compliance with the relevant reporting system of the United Nations Organization.

Somogyi welcomed the fact that, alongside the European disarmament negotiations, the Soviet-American disarmament talks are beginning to form a favourable picture.

In connection with the multilateral disarmament talks, Somogyi said, "it seems that the viability of multilateral disarmament can best be proved by the speedy elaboration and conclusion of the chemical weapons convention.

"The Hungarian Government has moved more than once to prove its commitment to the cause of a complete, general ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. It also wishes to bring about an early conclusion of a ban treaty by all constructive means at its disposal.

"This is shown by the unilateral Hungarian initiative to comply with the planned provisions of the chemical weapons convention already under preparation.

"In this context, Hungary would be ready to make a declaration on the production and export-import turnover of chemicals, as well as to submit—on a reciprocal basis—the declaration to verification, together with data on military, industrial and trading activities relating to the convention."

Ferenc Somogyi presented the relevant working document to the session of the disarmament conference.

### **Change in Armed Forces Previewed**

*LD2302135490 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] A news conference has been held in the Defense Ministry about ideas relating to the strengthening of the national aspect of the Army. Janos Hollos reports.

[Begin Hollos recording] If approved by the National Assembly, then from next week the Hungarian Armed Forces will have a new name: Hungarian National Defense, instead of the Hungarian People's Army. A string of ideas lies behind the intention to change the name, which aim at having the ministry develop the national aspect of Hungarian national defense. In accordance with this, there is a completely new starting point for the training of the Army. Instead of the enemy concept of earlier decades, the fundamental idea now is that the Hungarian Republic does not have an enemy until somebody infringes her borders. As a consequence of this, new service and technical regulations are under preparation, which will be built on the statutes of the Hungarian Republic.

According to the plans, the soldiers will have new uniforms. Apart from this, the emblems, decorations, insignia and squadron flags will change. [passage omitted]

The rehabilitation of those condemned in 1956 is under way in the Army, and they are reviewing the names of corps. They are looking for new eponyms. After scarcely six months, the Defense Ministry's weekly magazine is to change again. From 15 March, it will appear under the name MAGYAR HONVED with a changed format and content.

At the news conference it was also mentioned that there are worries over conscription. Many people are asking for a deferrment, naturally reckoning with the fact that, as is common knowledge, the 12-month period of service will soon be introduced in place of the present 18 months. This time, 10,000 fewer young people are being called up than usual, 14,000 conscripts in all. The reason for this is that in harmony with the scheduled troop reductions, some squadrons have been disbanded. [end recording]

### **Soviet Troop Withdrawal Accord Expected 10 Mar**

*LD2602195890 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 26 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] The government today discussed the assets of the party and the former Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. The halting of ruble-accounted exports was discussed. The Council of Ministers extended the ban on food exports until 1 July. Another date: the agreement on Soviet troop withdrawals is expected to be signed 10 March. Government spokesman Zsolt Bajnok speaks to Gabor Bankuti.

[Begin recording] [Bankuti] The government today discussed the use of party assets, the assets of the former MSZMP. How far did they get? Let us begin by asking when the headquarters on Jaszai Mari Square [in Budapest], the so-called White House [Feher Haz], will get into government hands.

[Bajnok] I cannot reply to this after today's session. The government commissioner who deals with the utilization put an entire volume of material on the Council of Ministers' table. What is at issue are some 200 premises, indeed somewhat more than this. At today's session the government acknowledged this briefing with the emphatic request that in utilizing these buildings, priority must be given to use for health, education, cultural, the social purposes.

[Bankuti] Since you have mentioned social affairs, I have heard that Judit Csehak [minister of health and social affairs] has been given two months' leave.

[Bajnok] Yes, she asked for and was granted two months' unpaid leave, beginning 15 March. Minister Mrs. Judit Csehak is the director of the WHO's European region; she asked to be a consultant to the finalization of a very important submission by the organization. During her absence, State Secretary Istvan Gyorfi will lead the Ministry of Health.

[Bankuti] There was talk of the people's economic plan, although I do not know—maybe it is a bit too early for this.

[Bajnok] The high level of rubles surplus is causing very serious strains in the economy. Very intensive bilateral Hungarian-Soviet talks are under way. For example, the prospects of Soviet troop withdrawals make it more timely to compile a program for the rational utilization of the vacated premises and housing.

[Bankuti] Was there talk of when the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Hungary, or when an agreement on this will come about?

[Bajnok] There was talk of the latter. The Foreign Affairs Ministry informed the government that based on where the talks currently stand, the agreement on the troop withdrawals could foreseeably be signed 10 March.

[Bankuti] To my knowledge, a draft law is being drawn up on the nullification of the resolutions that stripped dozens of Hungarian citizens of their citizenship.

[Bajnok] Some 1,500 people or more are in question here. At today's session, the government voted in favor of a draft law that these sentences should be regarded globally as being null and void, or insofar as the people concerned lay claim to Hungarian citizenship after so much time, they will be Hungarian citizens again from the time they write their statements of intent. [passage omitted]

[Bankuti] On personnel issues: Is there a successor to Laszlo Somogyi, former government commissioner for the World Exhibition, who recently resigned?

[Bajnok] Ferenc Glatz [minister of culture and education] presented the preparatory committee's unanimous motion that Etele Barath be charged with this.

[Bankuti] He is state secretary in the Ministry of Transport and Construction. [passage omitted] [end recording]

## POLAND

### Walesa Views Soviet Troop Pullout, Other Issues

LD0802233390 Warsaw PAP in English 2200 GMT  
8 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Gdansk, February 8—Lech Walesa held his press conference in the "Polmo" car parts factory in Tczew (Gdansk voivodship) today.

### On Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

Speaking on his plans for visiting Moscow, Walesa referred to his proposal to withdraw Soviet troops from Poland voiced during his meeting with the USSR ambassador and stressed that stationing them is a waste of money which would be very useful for Poland.

We should defend ourselves, we should be in some alignments but in the ones adjusted to modern technology, not expensive but efficient. If I go to Moscow, I will firmly demand answer to that issue, and explanation what happened to officers (Polish officers executed in Katyn and other places in wartime), Walesa said.

If I am invited, it is not in order to drink coffee, make photographs, but to settle things we whisper about, he added.

### Presence of Soviet Troops May Be 'Trump Card'

LD1402151490 Warsaw PAP in English 1205 GMT  
14 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw, February 14—In the wake of the announcement on the Soviet Union's readiness to withdraw its troops from Poland, GAZETA WYBORCZA writes today:

"Before we remove the Russians beyond the Bug River, we should answer the question whether we want to remove them also from Germany. For it is hard to imagine the Soviet divisions marching out of Poland but staying in the territory of the present GDR—which many a Pole would deem much-desired.

"If, on the other hand, the Russians consistently withdrew from Germany, they would do that only to let the united Germany enjoy the status of a neutral state. This is a dangerous scenario for us. A neutral Germany is a superpower which, according to the German political tradition, could sooner or later start drifting towards the East and Russia.

"We have never profited by that. It is in the interest of Poland, and of other states, that this ship anchors in an integrating Europe.

"A new game will soon begin in the European policy. We are sitting down to it having poor cards. The Soviet troops in Poland may be—though it sounds paradoxical—our trump card. Europe is interested in their remaining on our territory till a new security system is created.

"It is worth realizing how much this card is worth. If we give it away right now, making Russians withdraw, we will not get a penny for it.

"The past year showed the Poles being a nation able to conduct a cautious policy. This added to our reputation in the world. The coming months will provide many opportunities to strengthen or to lose it. The question of Soviet troops in Poland is the first test," GAZETA WYBORCZA wrote.

### Siwicki Statement on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD1502190890 Warsaw PAP in English 1840 GMT  
15 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw, February 15—In relation to the USSR authorities' declaration expressing readiness for talks on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Poland's Minister of National Defence General Florian Siwicki conveyed to PAP the following statement:

I think that every state considers stationing foreign troops at its territory, even if they are units of an allied army, as a special and temporary situation. It is so in Poland as well. The problem however should be viewed in the political and strategic dimension.

Until now, the Armed Forces' units of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the Soviet and American ones including, have been stationed in a number of European countries. For instance, the northern group of the Soviet Army numbering some 50,000 soldiers has been stationed in Poland. It performs mainly logistic functions for the western group of the Soviet Army in the GDR. Thus it is an element in the alignment which ensures military balance in that strategic part of our continent.

Our national reason of state requires a wise approach to that complex and important problem, whose dimension is wider than Polish alone.

We expect that further progress in disarmament negotiations on conventional weapons will subsequently permit to reduce Soviet forces in Poland.

On the other hand, however, stormy processes at our western neighbors' may proceed towards a change in the hitherto alignment of forces in a short time. Therefore, I think, that the question of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, obvious in future, should be approached cautiously, without emotions, with the Polish interests, that is security of our country, guarantees of the inviolability of its borders, in mind in the first place, Minister Siwicki stated.

#### **Bundeswehr Reduction Proposed**

*AU1602151490 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI  
in Polish 14 Feb 90 pp 1, 2*

[Jerzy Markowski commentary: "Without Beating About the Bush"]

[Text] The breakneck speed of the process of German reunification raises well-founded fears, especially for us Poles. Putting aside our emotions and prejudices, but not our historical experiences, we must think about the difficult problems that still remain to be solved. These are problems of a military nature. Putting the solution of these problems off into the future, invoking the future international conference, which is to create a new European security system, looks like an attempt to pull the wool over our eyes. The logic behind this approach is simple: Let us not raise these difficult issues in order not to hinder the process of German reunification. This is unacceptable. On the contrary, we must focus on these problems as we have never done before.

Surprising things are happening in military matters when set against the background of reunification. There is talk of removal or substantial cuts in the number of Soviet troops currently stationed in the GDR, and there is talk that NATO—including a reunified Germany under its umbrella—will not extend its influence further to the east, but there is nothing said about the future role of the Bundeswehr in a reunified Germany. Why should this be so? Why do none of the unification projects make any mention of limiting the size of the Armed Forces of a future Germany? Why are the great powers not bothering to pressure the future German sovereign state into renouncing the use of nuclear weapons now, when they can still exercise some kind of pressure? Nothing would seem

to stand in the way of obtaining such a concession. Such a demand would be sensible and would not be disagreeable to the Germans.

For us Poles today, the future of the Bundeswehr cannot be a matter of indifference. We know that it will be very strong. It is equipped with the latest technology. There is no branch of military technology—including rocket and missile technology—that remains unknown to the German military armaments manufacturers. The strength of a modern army is not decided by its numbers, but by its quality, and the Bundeswehr is strong on both counts. Additionally, we are already seeing some interesting developments—as reported by one of the West German weeklies—that special companies of ex-GDR citizens are already in the process of being formed, and apparently, some 115,000 ex-GDR citizens are already in the queue to join the Bundeswehr. Fears of the potential growth of the Bundeswehr can be alleviated by Western promises of linking this army to NATO and thus securing some direct control, but as things stand presently there is nothing to stop a reunified Germany from withdrawing from the Atlantic Charter. The provisions of the Atlantic Charter guarantees this right to all signatories. The question whether Germany will make use of this provision is not simply a rhetorical one.

One has to agree with Henry Kissinger that the present line of political and military demarcation is no longer the same in Europe. If this is so, the divergence will increase in the future. Thus, our apprehensions are not at all exaggerated. It is not difficult to imagine that given the current pressures for the demilitarization of the GDR, Soviet troops will eventually leave this territory. The question is not whether, but when? When this happens, it will have a direct implications for us. Seen in this context, the matter of the quality and quantity of the Polish Armed Forces—the guardian of Polish sovereignty and security in the system of our alliances—assumes new meaning. The problem of German reunification has made this clear for all to see. In three to five years' time it may be too late. The issue requires maximum probity in formulating our defense policy. Looking toward the a greater Europe, we must not neglect our specific national interests.

European realities are changing fundamentally. We should be able to recognize these changes, and without emotion, firmly apply them in our policies. The military side of this problem must also be looked at without any evasions or silences. No harm to the process of reunification would be done by securing obligations to reduce the Armed Forces of the two German states to a necessary minimum, plan a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from the respective territories, refrain from stationing nuclear weapons, and reduce their military potential within the framework of their respective alliances. It may be that as a result of such assurances there would be fewer surprises for everybody, including us.

**Daily Cites Soviet Troop Withdrawal Offer**  
*AU2002105090 Paris AFP in English 1028 GMT*  
*20 Feb 90*

[Text] Warsaw, February 20 (AFP)—The Red Army would like to pull out of Poland, General Dubinin, head of the Army's northern group, was quoted as saying by the Solidarity daily GAZETA [as received] on Tuesday [20 February].

The Red Army has 50,000 men officially based in Poland.

"The Red Army is in favour of pulling out of Poland. The decision is up to the government. We are only here to back

up our troops in East Germany (380,000 men)", the general reportedly said during a visit on Sunday by President Wojciech Jaruzelski to a Soviet Army airborne unit in western Poland.

The Soviet Union recently said it was ready to negotiate the departure of its troops, if Poland made the request. A large body of opinion in Poland, headed by Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, has been calling for a rapid withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But the Warsaw government has reserved judgement, saying that such a withdrawal should only be within a new framework of European security.



**AFGHANISTAN****Two Stinger Missiles Purchased From Opposition**

*LD2102223390 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto  
1530 GMT 21 Feb 90*

[Text] On the basis of Decree No. 204 dated 18 Mezan 1366 [10 October 1987], the organs of the Ministry of State Security have today purchased two surface-to-air U.S.-made Stinger missiles and [word indistinct] from a commander of an armed opposition group attached to the Rabbani extremist group in the surroundings of Shakar Dara District [Kabul Province].

The military section of the BAKHTAR INFORMATION AGENCY reports that the purchase price of these rockets was paid to the other side in accordance with the decree.

**EGYPT****Al-Dajani Hopes for Egypt-Iraq Missile Production**

*45000087A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic  
22 Jan 90 p 5*

[Text] Dr Burhan al-Dajani, secretary of the Arab Chambers of Commerce, has asserted that Egypt will enjoy

tremendous advantages with regard to industrialization, especially over the coming 10 years, providing a technical, scientific, and handicraft base.

Dr Burhan also mentioned his hope that there would be opportunities for the economic integration of cooperation between Egypt and Iraq in missile production.

**IRAN****New Arms Production Lines in Operation**

*LD0602115390 Tehran Domestic Service  
in Persian 1030 GMT 6 Feb 90*

[Text] New arms production lines became operational this morning during a ceremony attended by the chief of staff of the Armed Forces; the minister of defense and logistics of the Armed Forces; the commander of the Ground Forces; and a number of other military commanders and deputy ministers of that ministry. The ceremony was held in the arms factory affiliated with the Defense Industries Organization.

# MEMO's Sturua on Utility of Aircraft Carriers

18120039 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 4,  
1990 pp 12-13

[Article by Georgi Sturua, section head, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences: "Does the Soviet Union Need Aircraft Carriers?"]

[Text] The headline is not precise on two counts. First, "aircraft carriers" should be in inverted commas, because officially the Soviet Navy still doesn't have any. There are two heavy aircraft carrying cruisers—the *Tbilisi* and the *Riga*. While in some of their parameters (the flight deck is 300 metres long and more than 70 metres wide) these ships are not unlike the US carrier *Midway*, which has been with the US Navy for more than 40 years, they are inferior to it in terms of the number of aircraft they carry (60 on the *Tbilisi*, 75 on the *Midway*). As explained by the Soviet Navy General headquarters, they are nothing but heavy aircraft carrying cruisers.

Second, the headline should be continued thus, "...and if it does, what type and how many?" Hard to answer. In addition, details that would enable an answer, remain top secret. So I can only venture my own view of the problem.

At one time I happened to study aircraft carriers debates in the US Congress. Far from being an exclusively military and technological issue, the matter was also hotly debated in leading US papers. In this country, I think, we have even more reason for a broad public discussion of this question.

The discussion in fact was started at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies. Speaking during the debates on the government report, Academician Georgy Arbatov said the money to build the aircraft carrying cruisers would have been quite enough to solve many social problems of the Soviet Armed Forces. Responding to this view, another deputy, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, was emphatically against the view that construction in this country of aircraft carrying ships had been a mistake.

Americans were deterred by the giant cost of their carriers, and—being pragmatic—wanted to know if there were cheaper alternatives to their huge carriers. It's now our turn to ponder roughly the same issue. Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army M. A. Moiseyev, maintains: "We should learn how to save on defence, and we will save." But I would stress that this saving shouldn't harm our country's defence capability: if it really takes a specific type of weapon to maintain this capability at a level of reasonable sufficiency, this weapon should be acquired.

Having studied theories on further expansion of their aircraft carrying forces, Americans found that all talk about heavy carriers being very costly but vulnerable, was a simplistic view of a rather complex idea. In terms of per ton displacement, a frigate, for example, costs more than one ton of the *Nimitz*. The cost of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is higher than that of a carrier with the usual power plant, but the difference in operating costs of both vessels over a 30-year period is minimal. The size of a carrier indeed makes it a more conspicuous target. But

crippling one doesn't appear so simple since it may take seven to 12 antiship missiles, and as many as 20 to sink one. The bigger the carrier, the simpler it is to provide it with active and passive defences. Despite their mobility, carriers are vulnerable, but hardly as vulnerable as such stationary targets as airfields. In short, the prevailing view in the US is that as sea weapons are being improved, the era of aircraft carriers is declining. But while it lasts, it's a good bet to build large (up to 90,000 tons) nuclear carriers of the *Nimitz* type.

The Soviet Union has started work on ships approaching the carrier class at what I wouldn't call the best time, when there are serious doubts regarding these ships (concerning cost efficiency). The Soviet Navy will face formidable problems in their deployment. In case of war, Soviet ships carrying aircraft would have to lock in combat with a navy that adheres to a strategy based on an offensive. According to official US Navy plans, the USSR would—in the North Atlantic theatre—face four aircraft carriers (100 fighters and 110 attack planes); in the Pacific theatre it would contend against seven aircraft carriers (170 fighters and 215 attack planes). In addition, and which is most important, hundreds of cruise missiles would be trained on Soviet aircraft-carrying ships. If the concept is that in order to neutralize the air threat to this country coming from the sea, the Soviet Navy should be able to deploy sea-based aviation in those areas not covered by ground-based aviation, it would appear that we should be prepared to construct powerful aircraft carriers and in a sufficient quantity at that. Otherwise, the costliest of our aircraft-carrying ships would be a considerably easy prey for the enemy.

What seems to be our choice? Spending many millions or perhaps billions, we have created a compromise—not really a heavy aircraft carrier on a par with modern US ships of this class, but a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, which is going to carry, according to official statements, exclusively fighter planes, i. e., planes unsuited to hit above-water targets. In the meantime, aircraft based on US carriers are capable of missile and bomb strikes against our cruisers. Thus, new Soviet aircraft carrying ships are being conscientiously put into a rather vulnerable position, given the fact that the balance of forces at sea already is not in favour of the Soviet Navy.

The probable objection to this may be that we couldn't afford heavy nuclear carriers immediately because the gradual development of ships of this class has yet to graduate to the required technological standards. One may regret that we are too late with the construction of large-capability aircraft-carrying cruisers, but regrets aren't arguments. The reality is such that the construction of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers is nothing but a rather costly experiment. We clearly can't afford it today when we need an additional 1.2 billion roubles from the defence budget to improve material and housing conditions for the military.

Let's suppose that the Soviet Union did build its own *Nimitzes* after all instead of the *Tbilisi* and the *Riga*. I'm sorry to admit that in this case we again would have spent

far greater funds and very irrationally at that. At best, 15 years from now we would have two aircraft carriers (in the world experience it's best to employ carriers in twos) in each of the two key areas, the Atlantic and the Pacific. How long will it take our Navy to master the new ships technically and tactically if the first landing of a fighter on the *Tbilisi's* deck was achieved only the other day? Fifteen years from now we would face an enemy with nearly one hundred years of experience in the construction, operation and, most important, deployment of aircraft carriers. I'm not asking how the construction of large aircraft-carrying ships of even the *Tbilisi* type tallies with the strategic policy of starting naval disarmament. Chances are we would have to agree to some cuts in the Navy even before each rouble invested into it started to pay off, as was the case with SS-20 missiles.

What shall we do now when two "semi-aircraft carriers" have already been launched? I think we can analyze the situation calmly in a balanced way and try to figure out if we should go on building cruisers of the *Tbilisi* type. Secondly, we should analyze whether it is expedient militarily and economically to press on for the long effort to make the cruisers a regular part of the Navy. Wouldn't it be better to use the released funds to develop alternative technology or improve the social needs of the military?

#### **Proposals on Reducing Confrontation Potential in Scandinavia**

904M00061 Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH DUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian  
No 11,  
Nov 89 pp 121-123

[Article by Sergey Vasilyevich Morgachev, MEMO department head: "New Political Thinking for Northern Europe"]

[Text] Political reality admits the possibility of two points of view of the situation in the North European region: geopolitical and purely regional. Various events in the region, various actions by the great powers or the North European countries are inevitably interpreted in terms of the global strategic balance, the heightening of a threat and its neutralization, actions and counteractions. It is equally natural that in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust—or insufficient trust—countries, depending on their point of view, traditionally propose different and even opposing interpretations of these events and actions.

At the same time, while the region occupies its place in geopolitical structures, it does not become dissolved within them, but exists as an integral political entity, as a single international political subsystem. It has developed its own mechanism, its specific logic of relations, certain traditions, and standards of conduct. Regional political thinking is not identical with geopolitical thinking. Stability and instability, balance and imbalance acquire their own regional interpretation. One and the same political action sometimes takes on different coloring within the framework of regional and global geostrategic logic in the same way that one and the same point in mathematics will be variously defined in different systems of coordinates.

This dualism and objective contradiction, in addition to the substantially sketchy and mechanical understanding of the realities of the present military-political situation, have also predetermined the contradictoriness of numerous attempts by Scandinavian political scientists to design the conception of supporting and strengthening stability and security in Northern Europe by operating simultaneously with the categories of regional and global strategic balances and their interrelationship. When conceptualized and reduced to its logical conclusion, this direction of thinking, which continues to dominate in Scandinavian studies, boils down to a kind of common denominator that could be called the "two-balance theory."

The main objective of this theory is to calculate a certain point of equilibrium—applicable to the concrete military-political situation in the North—that would simultaneously secure global and regional balances and that would identify paths of movement toward this point. This point is understood to mean a certain state (correlation) of armed forces and military activity of military blocs—the Soviet Union and the USA in particular—in Northern Europe. Paths of movement toward this point are understood to mean certain measures to alter military presence and military activity. The discussion primarily centers on the reduction of the Soviet military potential in the North.

Such a view of equilibrium cannot be found for three reasons, even one of which would suffice. The strategic military balance has long ago become a concept which, even though it retains a certain quantitative determinacy, is nevertheless very elastic and plastic. In this sense, the value of concrete traditionally proposed measures that should comprise the region's contribution to securing strategic balance (and this usually means an increase in the American military presence in the Northern seas and/or a reduction in the Soviet Union's presence here) seems highly debatable.

Moreover, regional military parity within the framework of West-East relations is a totally irrational concept in the context of modern military-technical and military-political realities. Security, especially nuclear security (just like danger), is indivisible and exterritorial. The various ways the region is involved in modern military mechanisms that function on a global scale and the need to analyze numerous factors that determine the situation inside and outside the region make the very formulation of the question of the regional balance of forces senseless and counterproductive.

Finally, the interconnected nature of the action of factors of military force and the functioning of different weapons systems are such that measures proposed as a means of moving toward a point of hypothetical regional equilibrium is frequently interpreted as violating global equilibrium and vice-versa. Nuclear weapons of different radii of action and with different delivery systems, the corresponding infrastructure, and conventional forces are a tight knot that cannot be untied within the framework of the aforementioned paradigms. The researcher of military relations in the North encounters this interconnectedness

at every turn. Whatever action you take—be it the positioning of American aircraft carriers and sea-based cruise missiles in the region of the World Ocean adjacent to Northern Europe, the creation of the infrastructure for receiving NATO rapid deployment forces, or the deployment of Soviet tactical nuclear systems and aeromobile and airborne assault units in the region<sup>1</sup>—all these actions are measured in both regional and strategic terms.

We can extricate ourselves from these vicious circles in which the thinking of researchers and politicians in both West and East has roamed for such a long time only by approaching the regional military-political situation as an integral part of the global situation and by conceptualizing safety, stability, and the reduction of military activity in the North exclusively on the basis of a dialectically comprehended strategic balance. In other words, by discussing concrete measures together with the idea of how to realize the region's potential contribution to lowering the level of overall military confrontation while preserving the stability of the entire military-political system. Within the framework of this logic, both bilateral and unilateral measures, including those that emanate from the Soviet Union, are conceivable.

It would seem that the well-known Murmansk (1987) proposals of the Soviet Union (and their subsequent concretization and development), which basically advanced the idea of reducing the activity of the naval and air forces of the opposing military alliances in the North European regions, could provide a generally acceptable basis for regional measures designed to promote the lowering of the general level of military-political tension. The idea of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe is also on the same plane. A nuclear-free zone essentially means certain reciprocal obligations (guarantees) of a number of countries plus measures to restrict military activity in the corresponding region. To all appearances, this is specifically the understanding of the zone that presently dominates political thinking in North European countries. The "only" question is the type and extent of the obligations and measures that must be proclaimed and implemented and how their burden should be distributed. The various political forces in Northern Europe interpret these questions in various ways, but the political vector is evidently still—albeit to a lesser degree than at the beginning of the decade—in the direction of demands for unilateral or larger-scale actions by the Soviet Union in the given context. The USSR has moved in the direction of accommodating these sentiments by dismantling medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and the greater part of them on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts; by withdrawing some operational-tactical missiles from these districts; and finally by declaring its willingness to withdraw nuclear-missile submarines from the Baltic Sea if agreement is reached on declaring the area a nuclear-free zone. The reduction of exercises by the Soviet armed forces in regions close to the borders of the Nordic countries was subsequently announced in October 1987.

The idea that the strengthening of Northern Europe's nuclear-free status will not go far until the willingness to

make concessions and compromises matures in the minds of politicians in all countries that are directly affected by this, has to a certain degree long existed in political thinking in the North—both at the official level and among political scientists. Back in 1981 Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister O. Ullsten spoke of the establishment of a border zone, from which all nuclear weapons exclusively targeted against Northern Europe, in particular, tactical nuclear weapons in regions of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Federal Republic of Germany adjacent to Northern Europe, around a nuclear-free zone (territory of the Nordic countries) would be withdrawn. Ullsten also noted that in connection with the formation of a nuclear-free zone, measures should be taken regarding Soviet submarines in the Baltic and similar NATO systems in the North Sea and other regions of the World Ocean adjacent to Northern Europe.<sup>2</sup> We also recall what future Norwegian Defense Minister J. J. Holst wrote while he was still director of the Norway Foreign Policy Institute: "Forward naval operations in the Norwegian Sea might also presuppose a double impetus toward preventive actions: to attack Soviet port facilities and Norwegian airfields. A policy of mutual deterrence by both superpowers, in accordance with which they would refrain from continuous naval patrolling of the Norwegian Sea, would reduce the pressure in the direction of preventive nuclear strikes."<sup>3</sup> In the same channel were proposals (1986) by Finnish President M. Koivisto to limit naval activity in waters adjacent to Northern Europe, and in particular to exercise restraint in conducting naval maneuvers and landing exercises.

Thus, ideas compatible with the principles of the new political thinking are present in the discussion surrounding security issues in Northern Europe, but they have by no means as yet become dominant among North European politicians and especially in U. S. and NATO political circles. Plans for a nuclear-free zone and the Murmansk proposals continue to be studied, but the problem is the unwillingness of Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the USA (or rather: the USA, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) to sit down at any kind of negotiating table. The principal political forces in the North European NATO countries indicate—and rightly so—that the given problem cannot be resolved without the clearly expressed consent of partners in the North Atlantic alliance and their direct participation in the discussions and negotiations because the question directly concerns their security and their armed forces. The next question is the kind of forms this participation should take. It is important that the political decision to undertake the practical examination of the possibility of reducing the level of military confrontation in the North has not as yet matured either in the USA or at NATO headquarters.

Until such a decision is made, there will be no progress, just as there has been no progress up to now. This in itself confirms the inseparability of regional problems from the general context and the indivisibility of nuclear and other security.

It would seem that these principles should also be the basis for the conception of international negotiations on

reducing military activity in the North, including the problem of the nuclear-free zone. Discussions between Nordic countries on whether the coordination of positions on the zone of the Nordic countries themselves should precede the coordination of the positions of North European participants in NATO with partners in the bloc or whether the order should be reversed could hardly lead to a common denominator, just as it has not led to one up until now since the very formulation of the question, which presupposes dividing the indivisible, has been flawed. But the Nordic countries will stumble over manifestations of this methodological flaw until the dominant view is that the negotiating mechanism must in principle be interconnected in time and must provide for the participation of all interested parties. This could take the form of parallel consultations or international conferences on Northern Europe.

#### Footnotes

1. See "The Military Balance" (London) for the '80's.
2. See, for example, HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 13 June 1981.
3. BULLETIN FOR PEACE PROPOSALS, No 3, 1983, p 229.

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#### Book on Nuclear-Free Zones and International Security Reviewed

904M0006L Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 151-153

[Review by N. Seregin of book "Bezyadernyye zony i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost" [Nuclear-Free Zones and International Security] by V. F. Davydov, Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya," 1988, 191 pages]

[Text] The complex of questions connected with the creation of nuclear-free zones occupies a special place among the most important international problems of modern time. The world has amassed enormous arsenals of atomic arms that are a million times more powerful than the bombs used at the end of World War II. The nuclear threat is making an extremely unfavorable mark on many forms of human activity and thought, is undermining society's moral foundations, is worsening international relations, and is ultimately fraught with the destruction of all civilization on earth.

The book under review examines the entire spectrum of questions associated with the creation of nuclear-free zones that can become a powerful barrier against the spread of these weapons. The author analyzes corresponding concrete proposals by various countries, shows the evolution of scientific conceptions, and evaluates the position of various political and social forces on the given range of questions. The reader's attention is focused on the

idea that the movement for the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons has acquired a worldwide character in recent years.

Comparative analysis is frequently used to evaluate a new publication by an author as a method that makes it easier to understand its specifics and to reveal its truly original features. Unfortunately, in the given instance such a method is hardly applicable since our sociopolitical literature has clearly not devoted sufficient attention to this problem and because there has been no comprehensive work on nuclear-free zones to date. Nevertheless, a critical view of V. Davydov's monograph makes it possible to reveal its strong and weak points, to show the author's omissions and derelictions.

For example, a number of questions are raised but essentially no answer to them is given. We read that the idea of nuclear-free zones originated in the mid-'50's (pp 13-14), but that by the end of the '80's there were only two such large zones in the world—in Latin America and in the South Pacific (The Treaty of Tlateloko [sic] and the Treaty of Rarotonga). What is the hitch? The work does not reveal the mechanism that blocks the creation of such zones and does not show how the obstacles that arise could be eliminated. It does analyze the positions of militaristic circles in the leading capitalist countries that looks askance at the possibility of establishing such zones.

The author unfortunately does not explain why the Soviet Union for more than 10 years has not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco even though it was specifically the USSR that advanced proposals to create such a zone in the '50's.

We find that too little is said about the possible creation of a peace zone in the Arctic. The heated discussions of this problem in the scientific community of many countries are not shown. Many foreign specialists believe that this problem has acquired new significance in connection with Soviet initiatives set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's famous Murmansk speech.

On some points, the author has not eschewed old stereotypes, in particular, in supporting the notorious "image of the enemy." Thus, the chapter entitled "The Balkan Alternative" presents a detailed report of military preparations by NATO countries and especially the USA "that are trying to turn the Mediterranean into a springboard for its aggressive plans against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and independent coastal countries" (p 77). But this was a case of the "contractual," legal presence of American forces in a number of countries and routine military training exercises. V. Davydov is of course nevertheless correct when he concludes that the demilitarization of the Mediterranean and the possible establishment of a nuclear-free zone in this region would be major steps forward on the road to the normalization of the international situation at this "important strategic crossroads." The book also places all blame for nuclear tension in the world on the United States of America even though today there is hardly any need to conceal that a certain share of the responsibility for this is borne by literally all nuclear powers without exception.

While the monograph examines the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe in general terms, one would think that it should offer analysis in greater depth (this region is directly adjacent to Soviet borders and holds top significance for the Soviet Union's national security). The book cites many quotations and excerpts from the works of leading bourgeois specialists. But these quotations are selective and fragmentary. It would have made sense to polemicize in greater detail with one or two Western researchers. Such discussions make the material livelier, more dynamic, interesting, and hence more contemporary.

Nor can we fail to mention a number of points that are lamentably passed over in silence. Thus, the author describes in considerable detail the movement to establish nuclear-free cities in the West. By mid-1987, there were already more than 3200 such cities throughout the world (p 184). Alas, nothing is said about whether such cities exist in socialist countries, including our country, and what the prospects are here.

In our view, the concept of the new thinking as refracted in the problem of nuclear-free zones definitely required more attention. General judgments in such an important context are clearly insufficient. The place of nuclear-free zones in the overall complex of measures directed toward disarmament and strengthening international security should have been shown more clearly.

Some statements by the scholar, while essentially correct and timely, are quite vague. For example, he repeatedly emphasizes that nuclear-free zones are capable of strengthening international security on both a global and regional scale. However he says practically nothing about the specific ways in which this can be done. There is little discussion of the spheres of activity of the two largest

military-political blocs of modern time—NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and their potential evolution in connection with the impending establishment of new nuclear-free zones.

V. Davydov correctly notes that if all non-nuclear countries (and there are more than 150 of them in the world) pledged not to allow nuclear weapons on their territory, the arms race would be dealt a heavy blow. The potential sphere of their application would be sharply reduced because a considerable part of modern nuclear arsenals consist of low-powered rockets with atomic warheads, aerial bombs, and atomic shells and projectiles (p 186). However the reader would seem to be entitled to hope to learn how states that differ markedly in their political orientation and internal regime, that belong to different socioeconomic systems, and that have differing interests and views of the development of international events might develop a unified platform on this issue.

The work would seem not to have entirely shown the attitude of the major international organizations and research centers toward nuclear-free zones. Clearly, too little attention is devoted to the corresponding activity of Soviet and other diplomats at the UN.

At the same time, the most important point should be emphasized: the monograph is essentially the first attempt at an integrated approach to a vitally important topic. This is essentially the first attempt at a many-sided analysis of nuclear-free zones not only in Soviet, but also in world sociological literature. The significance of the book is on the whole indisputable. It will unquestionably be of interest to specialists and the broadest readership

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1989

## CANADA

**Canada Proposes Letting Soviets See Cruise Tests**

52200012A Windsor *THE WINDSOR STAR* in English  
10 Jan 90 p F5

[Text] Ottawa (CP)—The Soviet air force may soon be afforded a privilege denied ordinary Canadians: watching a cruise missile test in Canada.

Under a proposed open-skies system, military officials from Warsaw Pact countries would be free to monitor U.S. tests of the cruise missile in Canada, Ralph Lysyshyn, director of arms control and disarmament at External Affairs, said Tuesday.

For security reasons, no Canadian except for military officials has ever seen the cruise missiles in flight over Canada. Under open skies, the Soviets would be free to watch the tests from the air.

"There would have to be parameters at which you would have to say to them 'you can't fly right behind the aircraft that is carrying the cruise missile,'" said Lysyshyn.

"But we assume that if they wanted to fly some distance away and watch, that would probably be allowed. If you have a concept of openness you have to go along with it right through."

Open skies is a Canadian proposal that would allow NATO and Warsaw Pact planes to fly over each other's territory in unarmed aircraft on short notice. The flights would be meant to lessen tensions rather than gain an intelligence advantage.

After the news conference, Lysyshyn said in an interview that the Soviets wouldn't be invited to the cruise tests and there was no guarantee the U.S. would go ahead with a test if they knew it was being monitored.

"But we would not say to the Soviets 'you can't go.'"

Canadians have seen still photographs of the cruise as well as a U.S. film of the missile in flight over the United States, but never while it was being tested over their own country.

The subsonic, ground-hugging missile is capable of carrying nuclear weapons and has been tested in Canada since 1983.

Ottawa will be host at an open-skies conference February 12 where foreign ministers from the 23 NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries will discuss a treaty that would allow the surveillance flights.

Canada ran a successful test of the idea by flying an unarmed C-130 aircraft over Hungary on a flight path over Soviet and Hungarian army bases.

The Soviet Union has already indicated it will be coming to the conference with several proposals for changes to the open-skies idea.

The Soviets want a common fleet of aircraft and a sharing of all intelligence data. They also want clearance to fly over U.S. based in third countries such as the Philippines, Panama and Japan.

Canadian proposals call for individual countries within each alliance to conduct their own flights or pool aircraft and data within each pact.

Despite Soviet reservations, Lysyshyn said he expects the open-skies proposal to be drafted into a treaty by the time the second round of the meeting is held in Budapest later this year.

"Somebody used the expression that in this political atmosphere at this time, and given that this conference was such a good idea, this conference was doomed to success," he said.

**Toronto Demonstrators Protest Test Flights Over Labrador**

52200013A Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*  
in English 19 Jan 90 p A4

[Untitled article by Janet Davison]

[Text] Five demonstrators protesting against NATO's decision to carry out low-level test flights over Labrador and the proposal to establish a base there were detained yesterday after interrupting a Toronto luncheon speech by the head of the Western alliance.

The members of the Toronto Disarmament Network were removed from the Empire Club meeting at a downtown hotel after shouting at Secretary-General Manfred Woerner as he spoke on the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 1990s. They were released without being charged, police said.

"Keep your murderous war planes in Europe," one protester told Mr Woerner, a former pilot in West Germany's air force, before being hustled out of the room.

Mr Woerner, who appeared unruffled, said in his speech that he sees NATO as "the strongest force of the moment."

"United, we can shape history; divided, we will fall victim to the history shaped by others."

He said that in this time of rapid change in Eastern Europe, NATO must remain strong. "Certainly, the threat has receded. But the risks have not disappeared. There is still unrest. Look to the headlines, look to Azerbaijan.... Without NATO, who would co-ordinate Western forces?"

Mr Woerner, when asked how the alliance could justify the continued test flights over Labrador, said such activities are necessary as long as "you have military capabilities on the other side." But he did not rule out the possibility of reducing those flights.

Innu in Labrador and northeastern Quebec say the 8,000 test flights a year disrupt their lives.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

**Bonn Urges More Active Security Role for CSCE**  
*90EN0312A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German*  
*12 Jan 90 pp 22, 23*

[Unattributed article: "Bizarre Scenario"; first paragraph is DER SPIEGEL introduction]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry in Bonn is working out plans for the status of a unified Germany.

Last Thursday Frank Elbe, the foreign minister's chef de cabinet, interrupted a meeting where Hans-Dietrich Genscher was preparing for Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow to hand him a note. The foreign minister scanned the lines and proudly announced that his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, thought his proposals on the role of NATO in a unified Germany were "reasonable."

Last weekend the minister had already presented his "bizarre scenario," as he describes his plans, to his American colleague, James Baker, in a three-hour chat in Washington: Unified Germany will at first remain a military member of NATO, but the Western alliance's command area will not be extended across the Elbe to the Polish border. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will be allowed to continue to station divisions on the territory of the GDR.

The foreign minister hopes to accomplish two things with his proposals: to take away the Soviet Union's fear that NATO might take unilateral advantage of the transformation of the former socialist camp. And to make it clear to the NATO allies that the Germans are not looking for a special path outside the alliance.

As far as Genscher is concerned, this puts an end to the debate over possible German military neutrality that GDR Premier Hans Modrow had stirred up with his "Germany United Fatherland" plan. "It's not suitable for our era," says his chief of planning, Klaus-Juergen Citron.

At the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich the weekend before last, graying NATO security experts and soldiers once again painted truly frightening pictures: a people 75 million strong in the heart of Europe, wavering between the two blocs and a potential threat to its neighbors. Not many paid them any heed.

At a time when all systems are go for cooperation, the laws of the cold war no longer hold; the military blocs are losing their significance.

In the 1950's great struggles had been fought over the concepts "neutrality" and "neutralization." In 1952 Stalin offered the tempting prospect of a neutral unified Germany to prevent the Federal Republic from entering a Western military alliance. The West refused because it wanted to protect itself from eastern superiority with the aid of a West German army, and because in any case Konrad Adenauer considered linking West Germany to the West more important than any attempt at reunification.

Since then the Soviets, too, have become interested in stability and have cautiously retreated from their old way of thinking about neutrality. "Gorbachev is a realist," says one Genscher advisor, "who knows that today neutrality is no longer on the cards." East and West obviously are equally averse to the idea of a neutral great power in the middle of Europe. Said Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski last week in Bonn: "I see no advantage in neutralization. For us Poles it is important to bind Germany."

As early as April 1989, Gorbachev's advisor for German affairs, Vyacheslav Dashichev, had predicted in a memorandum that "the thinking about the neutralization ... of a reunified Germany ... is ceasing to have any meaning. It would therefore be unreasonable to preach the principle of neutralization when conflict situations and confrontations between blocs are no longer the order of the day."

Today, since the revolution in the GDR, we have arrived at a situation where politicians in East and West agree that the unification of Germany can no longer be held up.

This week in Ottawa, Canada, begins a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, who are to agree on what until very recently had been unthinkable: All participants from East and West are to declare their airspace "open sky" and let intelligence aircraft from the other side monitor their territory.

On the threshold of German unity, the CSCE—the acronym stands for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—is to act as the key to the future European peace order. The idea of a collective security structure, once developed by the Soviets and rejected by the West, is gradually taking shape. The foreign ministers, including Baker and Shevardnadze, want to think about how the NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances can be transformed into a common security organization.

The Foreign Ministry in Bonn has already sketched out preliminary plans. In order to bring about a "partnership in stability" (Genscher) on the continent, it will suggest that agreement be reached in the Vienna disarmament negotiations to reduce conventional forces and short-range nuclear weapons drastically. The first treaty would be ready to sign by the time of the CSCE summit in the fall.

The Americans and the Soviets would then withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Central Europe and would scrap thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft. The other allies would follow suit. No one can predict how many troops there will still be in Europe in two years, in view of the constant new arms reduction proposals.

The Foreign Ministry's thinking goes even further, however. In order to promote mutual trust, do away with the fear of the enemy, and make military aggression impossible, the general staff chiefs of all the CSCE states could form a European military council to work on the alliances' strategies and develop new structures for the armed forces. In the future the armies in the East and the West would no longer be capable of attack, only of defensive missions.



In order to monitor arms reductions and compliance with the treaties on confidence-building measures, a verification center will be set up. There, monitors will exchange their observations from viewing maneuvers; the disarmament monitors will acquire a common fleet of aircraft and helicopters.

As an "early warning system," Genscher is also thinking about a European conflict center, which would attempt to resolve disputes among CSCE states peacefully. He is also thinking about a European peace force under the supervision of a standing CSCE council patterned on the United Nations. The treaties among the 35 member states would be formulated in far more binding terms than the UN Charter.

Until these visions of the future become reality, Genscher envisions that Soviet divisions could remain in the eastern portion of a unified Germany, although with a special status like that of the French troops in the Federal Republic, which are not integrated in NATO. The Soviet Army's encampments would be declared "extraterritorial territory." This would also give Moscow time to withdraw the troops, because as of today the Soviets do not know what they will do with the officers and men back home and how they will integrate them into the civilian labor market.

The difficulties that withdrawal can lead to are apparent from the negotiations between Moscow and Prague on the return of the Soviet troops that marched into Czechoslovakia in 1968: The uninvited guests are refusing to pay for the freight cars and tickets for the trip home.

**Bonn 'Apparently' Approves Tornado Sale to ROK**  
*LD1802163390 Hamburg DPA in German 1516 GMT*  
*18 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The federal government, in its latest decisions about arms exports to countries outside NATO, has approved not only the sale of tanks and submarines to Middle East states but has also apparently approved the supply of 50 Tornado fighter aircraft to South Korea. This was learned reliably by DPA in Bonn today.

According to these sources, the Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) aviation enterprise received a positive reply to a so-called preliminary inquiry for the Tornado exports, which had been the subject of discussion for some time. Bonn thus made clear that, from an international viewpoint, it has no reservations about future supplies. The manufacturer will be able to rely on this "element of confidence" while pursuing the deal. [passage omitted]

It was learned last week that the Federal Security Council—a secret cabinet body—had given Messrs. Krauss-Maffei permission to build 100 Gepard anti-aircraft tanks for Saudi Arabia. The HDW [Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft] and Thyssen-Nordsee shipyards were given the "green light" for the construction of the two strategic submarines for Israel, with the Israeli Navy procuring and providing the electronics and weapons.

It was also learned today that Thyssen-Rheinstahl has been given a positive reply to its preliminary inquiry about constructing two small submarines for the Arab Gulf state Bahrain. [passage omitted]

## FRANCE

### Paper on Ottawa Talks, European Troop Reduction

*PM1602102290 Paris LE MONDE in French*  
*15 Feb 90 p 1*

[Editorial: "The Kremlin's Flexibility"]

[Text] The speed with which the foreign ministers of the two alliances reached agreement in Ottawa on 13 February on three important issues says a great deal about the new style of East-West diplomacy. At a time of great upheavals imposed by peoples, governments are finding it difficult to keep pace, but at least they are trying to do so. And, above all, the flexibility of Soviet diplomacy now makes it possible to do in two days the work which formerly took years.

It was in fact another "da" from Mr. Gorbachev which made possible agreement between the two superpowers on the level of their troops in Europe in addition to agreement on the U.S. "Open Skies" plan which had already been reached. Initially, the Soviet president had demanded that not only U.S. units, but other countries' contingents deployed in the FRG be placed in the scales against the troops which the Red Army maintains outside its borders in Europe. He then decided to forget these European forces, but demanded at least that parity be maintained with the American troops.

Moscow finally gave way on that point too and the balance of forces between the two powers will therefore tip in favor of the United States for the first time since the war. In view of their bases in Britain and around the Mediterranean, the latter will have 30,000 additional soldiers. It is true that, as President Bush remarked, the USSR has the advantage of proximity, with garrison forces which it will maintain on the European part of its territory.

Indeed, there is reason to wonder if the Soviet Union will be able to reach the ceiling of 195,000 men which it is allowed in Central Europe, because its troops, already undesirable in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, will probably soon also be undesirable in Poland, and the maintenance of its main contingent, the one in the GDR, seems increasingly problematical given the prospects of German unity.

In this connection, the third agreement reached in Ottawa only relates to procedure. The fundamental questions raised by reunification are postponed to a forthcoming conference among six countries (the four former occupying powers and the two German states), and there is still a "net" to overcome—Moscow's rejection of the idea of a "Greater Germany" as a member of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, on this point too, it is difficult to see how the Soviet Union could hamper the Germans' free choice. Unless there is a sudden hardening of line in Moscow, it

can be expected to back down on other issues, especially since military arrangements are possible, and Western leaders are determined to sugar the pill—probably the bitterest that the Soviet leadership will have to swallow.

#### **Defense Minister Chevenement Discusses Arms Cuts**

*PM2002151690 Paris LE MONDE in French  
20 Feb 90 p 7*

[Text] Jean-Pierre Chevenement, who was the guest on the Luxembourg Radio-LE MONDE Grand Jury program on 18 February, said that "when the time comes, France will play its part in the reduction of forces and equipment decided in the framework of the Vienna negotiations" on conventional disarmament in Europe. However, the defense minister did not specify the scale of these reductions, merely stating that "studies are under way" and that he had "some ideas" on the subject. Regarding a possible withdrawal of French forces from the FRG, he added that "it is up to the German Government to tell us what it wants" because the presence of those troops is governed by a bilateral agreement between the two governments concerned.

In reply to French Socialist Party First Secretary Pierre Mauroy, who wants a further reduction in France's military funding, Mr Chevenement reaffirmed: "We have already reduced the funding of the military programming law which was adopted in 1987 and have made savings of 45 billion francs.... We are a kind and generous party which may, in some cases, generate illusions. As defense minister, I cannot rule out any of the possible hypotheses concerning the future of our security in the next 10 years.... There are certainly savings to be made if we reduce our forces even slightly in the framework of the Vienna negotiations. But that will take time."

Regarding the future of the Hades prestrategic nuclear missile, which has a range of less than 500 km, Mr Chevenement said that there is "a deep misunderstanding" about it. "If we had to eliminate all weapons with a range longer than the width of the Rhine, we would only have shotguns left," the defense minister remarked and he asked: "Can we permanently rule out the possibility of France having to face an attack on land? Is it not better to deter in advance? It is the role of prestrategic weapons to show a potential enemy that he is likely to get hurt."

"The very idea of a neutral Germany does not have much sense," Mr Chevenement said. "A magnet cannot be neutral, and Germany will be a magnet.... I have absolutely no doubt about Germany's European commitment," he added. "The military problem is second to the economic problem. Germany will obviously be a very great power. This is a challenge for France. We must have the courage to say this to the French people. Because it is a big challenge it is also a big opportunity—that of mobilizing France, of uniting it on a long-term project. I am in favor of a peoples' Europe and opposed to the Holy Empire of capitalism. I want us to build a peoples' Europe with the nations which make up the wealth of this Europe."

#### **Franco-German Defense and Security Council Meets**

*PM2202115490 Paris LE MONDE in French  
21 Feb 90 p 4*

[Text] The Franco-German Defense and Security Council formed two years ago in Paris does not rule out the prospect of setting up multinational forces in Europe on the model of the Franco-West German brigade now being formed.

Division General Klaus Naumann, head of the Political and Military Department of the West German general staff and secretary of the Franco-German Defense and Security Council, and Bertrand Dufourcq, director of political affairs at the French Foreign Ministry and deputy secretary of that council, stated this on 19 February at a news conference devoted to the council's work since last fall when that body started work.

According to Gen Naumann, it is a "question of the future" to "try to set up multinational forces" in Europe because of a new security situation in that region of the world, linked with the Vienna disarmament negotiations and the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. "This is one way of taking account of this situation," the West German general explained. "The changing situation in Europe forces us to use our imagination" Mr Dufourcq said. "This is a path to be explored. We must not automatically reject any line of thinking, and it is clear that the idea of multinational forces is a hypothesis which could be envisaged. The Franco-German brigade is an initial model for what such a force could be," the French Foreign Ministry official added.

Regarding this 4,200-strong Franco-German brigade now being formed, Gen Naumann thinks that "everything is going according to plan." "There is no sign of any intention to depart from the the plan," he said.

"In a period in which changes in Eastern Europe and the prospect of German reunification demand the redefinition of a security system for the continent, in which the expected reduction in U.S. forces in Europe obliges the West European countries to take more control of their defense effort, in which conventional disarmament in particular is experiencing an impetus which nobody would have dared believe just one year ago," Gen Naumann concluded, "It is of fundamental importance that France and the FRG cooperate even more closely on matters relating to Europe's security."

#### **NORWAY**

##### **Comments on Reduction of Troops**

*LD1402225590 Helsinki Domestic Service  
in Finnish 1600 GMT 14 Feb 90*

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The agreement in principle between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of troops in Central Europe will considerably change the European military scene. According to a timetable, to be negotiated later, the United States and the

Soviet Union will withdraw altogether hundreds of thousands of troops from Europe. Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, who is currently visiting Finland, thought the agreement achieved in Ottawa would concern a couple of hundred thousand Soviet troops in East Germany and Poland.

Matti Vaeisaenen reports: [passage omitted] When asked in Helsinki about the effects of the agreement, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, referred to the unilateral troop cuts announced by the Soviet Union and said that the Soviet Union would withdraw a couple of hundred thousand soldiers from East Germany and Poland.

Moiseyev does not here include the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and Hungary because the Soviet Union is directly negotiating with the governments of these countries on their withdrawal. If we assume that the Soviet Union withdraws, according to separate agreements, all its troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as these countries desire, and a couple of hundred thousand men from East Germany and Poland on the basis of the (?TAE) agreement, almost exactly the same figure is reached as the number agreed for the United States in the whole of Europe.

The deployment of conventional armed forces may, however, become a problem for the Soviet Union. As Poland also wants to have direct talks with Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, only East Germany may remain among the allies as a country of deployment; it has up to now had clearly the largest number of Soviet soldiers on its territory. On the other hand, the negotiations on the reunification of the two Germanys and the position of the future united Germany are already making rapid progress. The question emerges, among others, how to reconcile the presence of Soviet troops, for instance, in the eastern part of a Germany which belongs to NATO or which is neutral.

### Country Offers To Host Chemical Weapons Testing

*LD2002235690 Helsinki Domestic Service  
in Finnish 1400 GMT 20 Feb 90*

[Text] Finland is offering to be the host country providing the central laboratory for the systematic monitoring of the complete ban on chemical weapons. Aarno Karhilo, under secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry, speaking at the Geneva disarmament conference, said the laboratory is a small but important part of the system for monitoring chemical weapons. Austria and the Netherlands, among others, have offered to be host countries for the whole system, but the laboratory can be sited in another country than the headquarters of the system. Under Secretary Karhilo emphasized at Geneva that the Finnish chemical weapons monitoring project is scientifically [word indistinct] and internationally highly regarded.

## SPAIN

### Defense Minister Serra on Defense Plan Changes

*PM2302121890 Madrid YA in Spanish 30 Jan 90  
p 17*

[Untitled report by Javier R. Ventosa]

[Text] Madrid—Spain's defense plans will be substantially changed as a result of the outcome of the Vienna conventional disarmament talks, according to what Defense Minister Narcis Serra announced yesterday during his appearance before a Congress [of Deputies] committee, to which he explained his ministry's basic guidelines for the current legislative term.

Serra stated that the "dizzying process of political transformation" of the East European countries "has upset the defense plans of the Western countries," some of whose organizations, such as NATO, will have to undertake a number of changes "toward a political and not a purely military alliance." The minister said that, as a result of this process, the outcome of the Vienna talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will substantially affect Spain's defense planning. In this connection, he said that the Joint Strategic Plan (PEC), whose drafting should be completed before the summer, "will have to change many of its assumptions" as a result of those talks.

Among the measures which will affect Spain's defense planning in the current legislative term, Serra cited the updating of the National Defense Directive, the review of the General Defense Plan and of the Armed Forces' logistic operations plans, and the updating of the regulatory framework for civil defense.

He also expressed the need to persuade the European allies to implement cooperation policies aimed at the North African countries to guarantee security in the Mediterranean—"an aim which has not yet been achieved."

According to Serra, the ministry's personnel policy in the current legislative term will be based on the ideas expressed by the prime minister in the investiture debate on a forces reduction accompanied by greater efficiency, within a context of greater professionalism in the Armed Forces. In this connection, the defense minister stated that the military personnel law "will take up much of the ministry's efforts," citing, among others, the plans to integrate units and rosters in a smaller structure, introduce the system of promotion on the basis of aptitude, define the rules for the allocation of posts, and improve NCO's' career structure, "in order to prevent NCO's from wishing to cease being NCO's to become officers."

Serra reiterated the desirability of compulsory military service, which will be updated through the military service law—which is to include its reduction to 9 months—and the presentation of the military service modernization plan, in addition to an increase in the number of special volunteers.

With respect to the subject of arms and equipment, Serra explained again that this will be strongly influenced by the Vienna talks and by the subsequent harmonization plans

which will be implemented together with the European allies. In this connection, he stated that cooperation efforts with Spanish industries will be stepped up by giving an impetus to research activities and cooperation programs, which will enable the industries to "increase their technological capabilities."

## UNITED KINGDOM

**UK, France Reportedly Want Cuts in GDR Forces**  
*PM2102090890 London THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH*  
*in English 18 Feb 90 p 2*

[Untitled report by diplomatic correspondent Simon O'Dwyer-Russell]

[Text] Britain and France will insist on the virtual disbanding of East Germany's army, and on sizeable cuts in the West German army, at next month's meeting of the four allied powers and delegations from Bonn and Berlin to discuss German reunification.

According to Foreign Office sources, London and Paris agree that, without the reduction of East German forces to the status of border guards and cuts in the size of West Germany's Bundeswehr, by far the largest army in western Europe, European fears over future security cannot be allayed.

The alignment is in response to the way in which Mr Baker, US Secretary of State, and Herr Genscher, West German Foreign Minister, resisted the doubts of Britain, France and the Soviet Union about the need for an early meeting to discuss reunification.

"Britain and France have had similar military histories this century in relation to Germany, and they have similar and legitimate fears about the future," a Whitehall source said last night.

Herr Genscher seemed to agree that, after reunification, no German troops should be stationed in what is now East

Germany. He said NATO had agreed not to expand eastward in a united Germany.

"There is no question of NATO's extension east," he said in a radio interview yesterday. "And you cannot get around this by saying German armed forces are stationed in East Germany but they are not under NATO control."

Foreign Office officials involved in drafting so-called "option papers" for ministers at the four-power meeting said the favoured course would be to disband the 113,000-strong fighting elements of East Germany's army which, with their Soviet equipment and training, could not be integrated with the Bundeswehr.

The security of a demilitarised Eastern Germany would be left to Berlin's 50,000 border troops.

In the case of the West German Bundeswehr, which could field more than 900,000 troops, the feeling is that, with the evaporation of the Soviet military threat, no justification would exist for such a large standing army.

A Foreign Office source said: "Bluntly speaking, we've all been treading carefully around the issue of German military strength and reunification.

"Our proposal is all about sufficiency. Sufficient border troops in Eastern Germany to secure the frontier, and sufficient troops in the Bundeswehr to provide a credible contribution to NATO if it survives. It is difficult to see on what basis the Germans could oppose what is a reasonable request from London and Paris."

Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister, apparently told Herr Genscher and Mr Baker last week that a reunified Germany which combined the existing military power of the East and West Germany was unacceptable.

He has also made clear, with the knowledge and approval of Mr Hurd, Foreign Secretary, that there will be no question of the four powers lifting post-war restrictions imposed on West Germany.

These prohibit Bonn from possessing nuclear and chemical weapons, and building warships, and restrict German troop deployments to the NATO area.